


Assaulting Identity:

China's new coercive strategies in Tibet

ABOUT

Tibet Advocacy Coalition is a project established in 2013 by International Tibet Network, Tibet Justice Center and Students for a Free Tibet to develop coordinated strategies, monitoring tools, and reports to highlight the situation in Tibet at the United Nations Human Rights Council.

The Coalition members are International Tibet Network Secretariat, Tibet Justice Center, Students for a Free Tibet, Tibetan Youth Association Europe and Tibet Initiative Deutschland, who work together with support and advice from Boston University's Asylum & Human Rights Program. The Coalition also offers support to other Tibet groups engaging in UN mechanisms and strengthen the global Tibet movement's advocacy work and lead an on-the-ground team of Tibet advocates.



CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
2. METHODOLOGY	6
3. BACKGROUND	8
4. SHAPING A NEW GENERATION FROM INFANCY	9
4.1. Kindergartens as new hubs for cultural re-engineering and military-style training	10
4.2. Eroding Tibetan language instruction in kindergartens & nurseries	12
4.3. Residential schools and “pairing” to monitor compliance of Tibetan students	14
4.4. “Patriotic education bases” for youth	14
5. LABOUR TRANSFER PROGRAMME AND RESTRUCTURING OF RURAL COMMUNITIES	16
5.1. The background: mass displacement and relocation	17
5.2. Alarming official figures on labour transfer as an element of rural remodeling	18
5.3. Highly skilled Tibetan herders and farmers framed as “unskilled”, “surplus” labour	21
5.4. An agenda of ideological indoctrination	22
5.5. Masking an expanded surveillance programme	22
5.6. Imposing the will of the party	23
5.7. The dangers of Tibetan language erosion	24
5.8. Tibetan prisoners and vocational training	25
6. PURGING RELIGION FROM THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF BUDDHISTS	27
6.1. Wu Yingjie’s harsh crackdown on religion	27
6.2. “Transformation through education”	29
7. CONCLUSION	33
8. RECOMMENDATIONS	34
NOTES	38

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A new phase of China's strategy on Tibet was set in place at the Seventh Tibet Work Forum in August 2020. This top-level conclave was presided over by Xi Jinping and established the direction of policy for the next five to ten years. The Forum mapped out an expansion and strengthening of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) coercive capability in Tibet, with the objective of "breaking lineage, breaking roots, breaking connections, and breaking origins".¹ To achieve this, the CCP is deploying a pernicious combination of systematic, harsh measures bringing together ideological indoctrination beginning at childhood; the restructuring and dismantling of rural economies through mass relocation, labour mobilization and transfer programmes and other measures, and a systematic intensification of data-driven policing and surveillance.

The intent of these policies is obscured beneath a proactive official discourse of "modernisation", "economic development", "poverty alleviation", "labour skills training" and "bilingual education". Party chief of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Wu Yingjie was less oblique when he stated on 31 December 2020 that official priorities were to "control the belly" and to "control the brain".² In other words, to render the Tibetan population both more dependent upon the state for their livelihoods, in order to ensure complete control, and to embrace Chinese cultural nationalism, the concept of "*Zhonghua minzu*".³ Ding Yexian, a senior leader in the TAR and head of the leading group on education, described this orchestrated campaign imposed from the top down by Xi Jinping, saying that: "Socialist ideology with Chinese characteristics in the new era informs the whole process of shaping the soul and educating people on a grassroots level."⁴

The protests that swept across Tibet in 2008 laid bare the reality that Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule remained strong, despite years of systematic repression by Beijing. Chinese leaders were no longer content with merely suppressing dissent in Tibet and moved from a strategy of "suppression to prevention". Rather than merely reacting to events once they have taken place, Chinese officials are now seeking to pre-emptively catch any signs of potential and perceived opposition, or even mild critique. **The intention is to change the way that Tibetans think and act in order to ensure compliance with CCP policy; to create a society in which not only is there no dissent, but the very idea of it is not even contemplated.** In order to achieve this, there has been an increasingly heavy emphasis on techniques of indoctrination and "controlling the mind."

A "cradle to grave" system of displacement, control and cultural erasure has emerged in Tibet. New methods of "controlling minds" have been imposed from an early age, with Tibetan toddlers increasingly being subjected to ideological education in hundreds of new and expanded kindergartens across Tibet. Such measures have been prioritized by Xi Jinping and in the Tibet Autonomous Region, are being implemented with zeal under Wu Yingjie's leadership in order to secure the loyalty of a new generation to the CCP.

But compliance and loyalty to the CCP cannot be achieved by indoctrination alone, particularly in a resilient population with a deeply rooted sense of cultural and religious identity. This focus is combined with an intensified campaign to remodel rural economies and livelihoods. A stepped-up programme of "labour mobilisation" is being implemented across the plateau contributing to the breaking apart of rural Tibetan communities and the destruction of traditional livelihoods. According to official figures – likely to be inflated in order to give the impression of meeting quotas – over the past five years 2.8 million rural Tibetans have been "transferred" from the agricultural sector to secondary and tertiary industry in urban areas, including numerous projects that fulfil China's strategic and economic objectives such as involvement in hydropower or mining projects.

This transfer of rural Tibetans into the urban wage economy emerges from the devastating impacts of relocation and resettlement of the Tibetan rural population over two decades, which has seen high

numbers of herders and nomads “sedentarized”, often moved into concrete block encampments in semi-urban areas far from their grasslands, with no sustainable means to provide for themselves and their families. They are now described by officials as “surplus” rural labour drafted into “training” programmes and new jobs in urban areas.

This new labour programme does not just target Tibetans in rural areas, but also political prisoners and released prisoners, who are regarded as a “threat” to the Chinese state due to their views. The programmes prioritise the Chinese language and redeploy prisoner labour into construction or other projects, including in the heavily militarised area of Nyingtri (Chinese: Linzhi) close to the Tibet-India border.

As part of the broader effort to break connections, lineages, lifestyles and loyalties, the CCP has simultaneously deepened its political crusade against religion, which strikes at the heart of Tibetan identity. Wu Yingjie is spearheading a new drive to separate religious beliefs “from life” and remove the Dalai Lama’s influence entirely. Criticism of religion is an increasingly important theme of compulsory political education in Party training facilities, villages, neighbourhoods, schools and workplaces and Tibetan monks and nuns continue to be heavily subjected to tough “re-education” campaigns. A handful of accounts even testify to the imprisonment, torture and the rape of Tibetan nuns. These measures aim to create a “Sinicized” official Buddhism, dissociated from the Dalai Lama, with the intention that future generations will only remember him as an enemy.

This new phase of coercive assimilation represents an escalated level of threat to Tibet’s linguistic, cultural and religious identity that far surpasses previous political campaigns and policy measures. It aligns Tibet with strategies being applied in East Turkistan (officially known as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region), for which Tibet served as a lab to pioneer and trial oppressive and dystopian control measures that were then amplified and accelerated against millions of Uyghurs subjected to mass internment and forced labour (with some then reapplied in Tibetan areas). A comprehensive network of inter-connected political mechanisms and facilities now operational in Tibet aims to drive the influence of the CCP deeper into people’s lives. As in Uyghur areas, increasingly intrusive surveillance of Tibetans’ everyday lives has been implemented, involving data-driven and predictive policing.

This is coupled with efforts by Beijing to push a vision of “non-interference” at the United Nations in order to further undermine democratic principles, human rights standards and accountability at the global level. This has only served to weaken and subvert one of the main mechanisms available to democracies to hold governments accountable for their human rights violations and has permitted a situation in which these large-scale violations in Tibet are not met with a well-coordinated international response or punishment. It is in this environment that calls by over 50 UN experts for the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism to assess China’s rampant human rights violations, including in Tibet, continue to go unheard⁵ and reprisals against human rights defenders have become routine.⁶

2. METHODOLOGY

Independent human rights investigations are virtually impossible in Tibet due to current restrictions and conditions in the country. The Chinese authorities do not permit access for foreign researchers to Tibet except in extremely rare cases, and then only on subjects that are not sensitive or likely to produce findings critical of the government. No other province level area in the PRC has equivalent barriers to access as the TAR which is regarded as a “red zone”. While the CCP portrays Tibet as “open”, denying access is increasingly used as a powerful tool to shut down critique by UN experts, journalists and foreign diplomats.⁷ The last UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to secure access to Tibet was Mary Robinson in 1998. To date, there are at least 19 outstanding visit requests to China by UN experts, some of which have been outstanding for over 15 years.⁸ China permitted only eight independent UN mandate holders access to the country between 1997 and 2020, and those mandates are highly skewed towards economic and social issues where the Chinese government sees its story as a success – women’s rights, extreme poverty, older persons and persons with disabilities.⁹

Any conversations with Tibetans living in the country about human rights violations would place them at significant risk of retaliation, including arrest and detention.¹⁰ The dangers and difficulties of communication via apps such as WeChat have been well documented;¹¹ Tibet-related content is targeted for censorship on WeChat, and there are cases of Tibetans being arrested for sharing chat messages, songs, and photos on WeChat with content related to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan culture that Chinese authorities alleged to be “anti-Chinese”.¹² Ethnic Chinese, too, face risks if they communicate about politically sensitive topics, particularly with foreigners or NGOs. Even once outside the country, Tibetans remain concerned about their status as well as about that of family members left behind.

As a result of these challenges, this report is based on a review of official government sources including Chinese governmental publications in both Chinese and Tibetan language as well as state media reports, with specific focus on a period from September 2020 to January 2021, but with reference to these sources from 2016 and earlier in order to track policy and shifts in language used by official sources. Any information stemming from Chinese state sources has to be evaluated carefully, as verification is often difficult, there is a history of false or at least exaggerated statements and statistics, and any information available is often subject to misuse by interested parties. To help mitigate the risk of using incorrect or falsified information, Tibet Advocacy Coalition has also used complementary information from known NGOs and contacts with proven track records.

We also studied commercial imagery of facilities and infrastructure across the Tibetan plateau which enabled identification of certain facilities in order to inform analysis. Tibet Advocacy Coalition obtained the Tibet Autonomous Region Vocational Skills Training Industry Enterprise Directory, detailing 147 companies registered and operating as of the beginning of 2019, and the Qinghai Province Vocational Skills Training Industry Enterprise Directory detailing 332 companies registered and operating as of the beginning of 2018. Although relatively scarce in comparison to availability from other parts of the PRC and Xinjiang, various government procurement documents were also studied, in addition to a number of publications by Chinese scholars published in the PRC, including various papers on “second generation” “ethnic minority” policies.

In order to contextualise this information and understand specific Communist Party terms, trilingual Tibetan researchers and well informed sources (Tibetans and others) in exile were consulted. These sources have access to the experiences and views of Tibetans inside Tibet, reflected in interviews and discussions on the topics covered by this report (for security reasons we could not speak to the latter directly).

The term Tibet is used generally in this report to refer to areas within the People's Republic of China that are traditionally inhabited by Tibetans. The eastern areas of the plateau, Kham and Amdo, have been incorporated into Chinese provinces, where they were designated "Tibetan autonomous" prefectures and counties within the western provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. The term Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), a province-level administration established by China in 1965, describes the western and central parts of the Tibetan plateau traditionally known as "U-Tsang".



3. BACKGROUND

The overwhelmingly peaceful protests that swept across Tibet in 2008 and the self-immolations that followed from 2009 onwards raised serious concerns for China's leadership about their ability to sufficiently suppress dissent among the Tibetan population. Chinese officials had previously sought to project the notion that only a handful of Tibetans, mostly monks and nuns, caused unrest in Tibet, entirely due to the Dalai Lama's influence. But after 2008, senior Party figures realised that discontent was widespread among the rural majority (including those who might have been expected to benefit most from economic policies) as well as among a few "troublemakers". There was an acknowledgement that efforts of persuasion and influence – the mass campaigns of "patriotic education" of the 1990s and beyond – had failed to ensure "stability" or to deeply touch the inner lives of Tibetans.

Researchers and Party officials were sent to Tibet to investigate the reasons to explore preventative measures for the future. It was decided that political education had to reach a new stage with a deeper reach in the "war against secessionist sabotage".¹³ The Chinese government now seeks to replace loyalty to the Dalai Lama in Tibetan hearts and minds with allegiance to the Communist Party state, and in doing so, to obliterate collective memories of a time before CCP control.

The view that regional leaders had failed in 2008 led to the introduction of sweeping and far more oppressive new administrative and security mechanisms in the TAR, some of which were later exported to East Turkistan.¹⁴ Prior to the mass internment of Uyghurs in East Turkistan, and under the leadership of soldier turned politician Chen Quanguo – now Xinjiang's Party chief – Tibet was used as a laboratory to implement oppressive new measures of total surveillance, an "iron grid" system of securitization and accelerated cultural and ideological indoctrination in order to create compliant citizens and Party subjects.

Under Chen's leadership, permanent teams of cadres were installed as managers in every monastery or religious institution¹⁵ and teams of cadres were installed in every village for three years (in 2016, this programme was extended indefinitely). In some cases, although this is more widespread in Uyghur areas, Party cadres live in Tibetan homes, learning in granular detail about their lives. "Grid system" offices were set up to monitor and manage each block or group of homes in every town and many villages.¹⁶ "Convenience police posts" were set up at city road junctions and elsewhere to track movement – there are now 698 such posts in the TAR.¹⁷ Tibetan society was divided into units of five to ten households, each with a foreperson responsible for political activities and economic conditions within the unit.¹⁸ This involves intensive data collection and enabling forepersons and local level police to input data on individuals using integrated electronic systems.

Chen Quanguo's efforts in implementing these policies in Tibet were endorsed in his transfer to East Turkistan, where he now serves as Party Secretary. In his place, the Chinese authorities placed Wu Yingjie, who has only accelerated efforts of coercive assimilation. **The objective of "breaking lineage, breaking roots, breaking connections, and breaking origins" represents a new phase of harsher policies against "ethnic minorities". In Tibet, this approach involves efforts to transform every aspect of what it means to be Tibetan** – particularly Buddhism and the Dalai Lama. It is the culmination of policy efforts following the events of 2008, and the self-immolations that followed from 2009 onwards.

A former Tibetan monk from the TAR who is now in exile explained: "China has always said its imperative is "long-term stability" in Tibet. Now this concept means something different. It doesn't only mean the absence or prevention of protest, it means you can no longer be Tibetan any more. Buddhism is central to our lives and our identity, it is our heart and mind, with the Dalai Lama at the core. The CCP wants to break that connection not only physically but in every way. They are seeking to replace that loyalty with a total dependence on the Party. Everything depends on this – your job, your family life – and everything is monitored, from how you spend every penny of your money to what you think. Every piece of freedom is taken away, and it is impossible to undo the knot that keeps you tightly under control."¹⁹

4. SHAPING A NEW GENERATION FROM INFANCY

KEY FINDINGS:

- New methods of “controlling minds” have been imposed from an early age, with Tibetan toddlers increasingly being subjected to ideological education in hundreds of new and expanded kindergartens across Tibet.
- “Military style” political education now features in the kindergarten curriculum with Tibetan toddlers required to wear Chinese military uniform and march with army personnel. Chinese flag-raising and national anthem ceremonies with the Tibet Police Academy also feature.
- The State-led kindergartens in Tibet are required to become “bilingual” which in practice means Chinese language teaching is prioritised over Tibetan, depriving Tibetan children of learning and understanding their mother tongue, a core element of Tibetan cultural identity. This has a deep impact on families; sometimes when they come home from residential schools, children are unable to speak to grandparents who cannot communicate in Chinese.
- Increasing numbers of Tibetans are being sent away to residential schools where they are “paired” with Chinese teachers and students for monitoring purposes. They are often required to pledge to uphold “ethnic unity” and be patriotic citizens. These policies are reminiscent of ones used by colonial powers who forcibly removed indigenous children in Australia, Canada and the US in order to assimilate them into “settler” society.



This image captured from Chinese state media shows a group of toddlers during a visit to a military headquarters. Entitled ‘Kindergartens of the Tibetan Military Region Organize a Different Kind of Patriotic Education’, © May 2019, China Tibet News.



Tibetan children at a kindergarten in Tsoe City (Chinese: Hezuo) in Gansu are pictured by the state media celebrating the New Year in Chinese style on 31 December, 2020. The official article states: “What we eat is Chinese style, what we wear is Chinese style, what is written is in Chinese characters”. © January 2021, Gansu Daily.

4.1. Kindergartens as new hubs for cultural re-engineering and military-style training

At the Seventh Forum on Tibet Work in August 2020, Party Secretary and President Xi emphasized the need for more political education in schools in order to ensure loyalty of the younger generation. **Xi called for “strengthening ideological and political education in schools, instilling the spirit of patriotism throughout the entire process of school education at all levels and types, and planting the seeds of loving China in the depths of the hearts of every teenager.”**²⁰

Hardline TAR Party boss Wu Yingjie also underlined the importance of “instilling the red gene” from an early age at a meeting in Lhasa in November 2020, saying that it was imperative to: “Strengthen the ideological and political education work for the younger generation to love Party, the motherland and socialism, and develop Mandarin language as the national language from their childhood.”²¹ These high-level instructions are being implemented with a significant expansion in pre-school education in Tibetan areas, focusing particularly on kindergartens (ages two or three to five). Such state intervention, with the aim of promoting ideology and prohibiting political views, is in contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which China ratified in 1992, particularly articles 12-16.²²

“Military style” political education has now been incorporated into the curriculum of Tibetan toddlers, including in the form of field trips to police or military units where Tibetan children have been required to wear military attire and engage in activities with these units. Highlighting their young age, a Chinese media article referred to Tibetan children taken on one visit as “cute babies” with the kindergarten teacher cited as saying: **“Today we take our children into the military camp to visit, in order to let them feel the life of the military camp from an early age. I also want to give them different national defense education in this way.”**²³

At one Lhasa kindergarten, the state media reported: “In order to fully arouse children’s patriotism, teachers and students of the whole park, under the leadership of the instructors

of the National Flag Guard of the Tibet Police Academy, jointly held a flag-raising and national anthem ceremony. The development of patriotism education activities allows children to know the national flag and love the motherland, so as to cultivate the deep feelings of love for the motherland and sow the seeds of patriotism in the children's young hearts." [...]

Basang Zhuoma, director of the Lhasa Experimental Kindergarten, was cited as saying that "The military training will become a precious memory in the growth of children."²⁴

In the Mingxin Bilingual Kindergarten in Tsoe City (Chinese: Hezuo), Gansu, Tibetan children were pictured celebrating the New Year dressed in Chinese clothes in a classroom decorated with Chinese-character banners one of which read: "What we eat is Chinese style, what we wear is Chinese style, what is written is in Chinese characters".²⁵

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has clearly stated that the right to take part in cultural life means that the state must abstain from "interference with the exercise of cultural practices and with access to cultural goods and services".²⁶ The Committee added that this right is "intrinsically linked" to the right to education "through which individuals and communities pass on their values, religion, customs, language and other cultural references".

A Tibetan from eastern Tibet whose young relatives attend a government-run kindergarten said: "Now the schools are focused on changing the children's minds, on manipulating them. When the children are given their banana, milk and snacks for lunch, for instance, before they eat them, the teacher says they have to thank the Communist Party, because the Communist Party provided their lunch." In a traditional Tibetan home, prayers would often be offered by the family in gratitude for meals before eating.

The same Tibetan source, who is now in exile, said that most parents have little choice but to send their youngest children to state-run kindergartens, particularly given the mass relocations and the demands of "labour transfer" programmes. "If you have been moved from your land to an urban area and you have to undertake some work or involvement in labour transfer then you have no choice but to put your children in kindergarten. Even if you are reluctant to impose this sort of education on your children, you have no choice," said the Tibetan, who is a monk from the eastern Tibetan area of Kham.



A Chinese official confirms the oppressive restrictions of the Sinicization campaign to reporters on an escorted tour of a vocational training school in Tibet. This shot is from a documentary about the visit by Channel News Asia on 20 November 2020.




Primary school children in Datong township singing a Communist Party song on the PRC's National Day. Datong township is in Driru (Chinese: Biru) county in Nagchu (Chinese: Naqu) prefecture, the TAR, an area that has been the focus of a crackdown following protests there in 2012-2013. Image from a state media video.

A Tibetan scholar who conducted fieldwork in eastern Tibet said that his own schooling in this style inculcated a sense of inferiority and shame in his Tibetan nomadic identity – even when the teachers were Tibetan, educated in Chinese universities. Huatse Gyal writes: “The school had a larger mission: to alter our fundamental values and minds. Through interactions with our teachers – Tibetans from the lowland farming areas who had recently graduated from Chinese universities – we came to realize that our bodies were not “clean” enough, that our speech was not “civilized” enough, and that we had to seek out a “better” life. Anything could be done to mold us into this ideal modern subject. [...] “If you don’t want to lead the backward lives of your parents, study hard”; “If you don’t study hard, you will be nothing but a stupid nomad.” **Our teachers drove us to hate our heritage, our elders, and even our parents.** As embodiments of the state, they were there to plant the sense in us that a good life was on the outside, and not in our communities. They were there to punish us for being the children of Tibetan nomads. We felt ashamed of our cultural background; we developed an antipathy to our socio-cultural world itself.”²⁷

4.2. Eroding Tibetan language instruction in kindergartens & nurseries

TAR authorities announced in 2016 that all kindergarten programmes have to become “bilingual” which in practice means emphasising Chinese. By December 2016, Chinese state media reported that Tibet invested 1 billion yuan in infrastructure for pre-school education “to popularize bilingual education” announcing that more than 458 bilingual kindergartens had been built or expanded in rural and nomadic areas in the region.²⁸ In 2018, the TAR announced that it would build 409 more bilingual education pre-school kindergartens and nurseries, and planned for the enrolment rate to reach 85% by the end of 2020.²⁹

This level of education mostly did not exist until the last few years, and there is a heavy focus on teaching Chinese, depriving Tibetan children of their mother tongue, the basis and core of Tibetan cultural identity, and on shaping young minds at a most impressionable age. This has a deep impact on families; sometimes when they come home from residential schools, children are unable to speak to grandparents who cannot communicate in Chinese. While the CCP states it has



This image from Chinese state media depicts Chinese soldiers “educating children on patriotism” in Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi), Sichuan, using the CCP red flag.

a “bilingual” policy, in practice it is monolingual, prioritising Chinese. In East Turkistan, too, there has been a similar focus on expanding and increasing the number of kindergartens, similarly prioritising the elimination of the mother tongue.³⁰

Just prior to the Seventh Tibet Work Forum in August 2020, the CCP Central Committee and State Council stated there was an imperative to: “Strengthen the construction of inclusive kindergartens, and vigorously train kindergarten teachers in poor areas. [...] Strengthen school language work to ensure that the national common language is used as the pragmatic basis for education and teaching.”³¹

The impacts are exacerbated by the closure and demolition of village-based Tibetan schools over more than a decade, to make way for expanded facilities that are often residential. Children have to board there from an early age, even if their families live nearby.³² “Even parents who take their children back and forth to school and communicate with teachers have to speak Mandarin,” said one Tibetan source in exile with family connections in Tibet. This has been the case particularly in monasteries, which have traditionally been centres for education in Tibetan society, equivalent to universities and schools in Western countries. These schools provided an education which was strongly grounded in Tibetan culture. Most monastery schools for young children have now been closed down particularly at major influential centres such as Kirti in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba), Sichuan, the Tibetan area of Amdo. Kirti became a particular target for deepening restrictions since a Tibetan monk, Tapey, set fire to himself in 2009, leading to the wave of at least 156 self-immolations since then, but numerous other schools for young children in monasteries across the plateau have also been closed.

This invasive new development of enforcing Chinese language education from infancy is potentially devastating in its implications for the survival of the Tibetan language. Tibetan is one of the most ancient and sophisticated languages in the world and has given rise to a remarkable literary and religious culture, key to the survival of its civilization and identity.

International human rights law obligates China to provide Tibetan-language instruction to the Tibetan population. The UNCRC states that “a child belonging to a ... minority ... shall not be denied the right ... to use his or her own language.”³³ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but not ratified, contains similar language.³⁴ Three UN human rights expert committees have also repeatedly expressed concern at China’s handling of mother-tongue instruction, and have called on the government to ensure Tibetan children are able to learn in their own language, and to protect those who advocate for mother-tongue education.³⁵

4.3. Residential schools and “pairing” to monitor compliance of Tibetan students

The same political education and socialisation into Chinese culture and society is enforced among Tibetan students studying elsewhere in the PRC, who are placed in residential schools with Chinese teachers, representing controllable environments where those who fail to conform can be punished.³⁶

There is a large population of Tibetans in China attending schools from junior high to university level; a recent state media report stated that over the past 33 years (and up to January 2019), 141,900 Tibetan students have been enrolled in various educational institutes, including 53,000 in junior high schools, 42,000 in high schools, 11,000 in technical secondary schools (secondary schools), and 35,000 in colleges and universities.³⁷ This includes schools specifically established for Tibetan students, and existing schools with classes for Tibetans in Chinese cities.³⁸



Tibetan students at a middle school in Anhui join classmates in a “pledge to uphold the unity of nationalities and be patriotic citizens.” © 2017 Peoples Daily.

There is a particular focus on absorbing “ethnic” students into the PRC framework, including by Tibetan-Chinese teacher and student “pairing” and other formalised affiliations in line with the imperative for ethnic culture to conform to mainstream Chinese.³⁹ Integration of Tibetan children into a mainstream Chinese system begins at an early age; in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba), the Tibetan area of Amdo, for instance, authorities announced in 2019 that more than 312 kindergartens, primary and secondary schools would be twinned with schools elsewhere in the PRC with the objective of teaching Chinese as the main subject.⁴⁰ This builds on similar “pairing” programmes established in Sichuan when the government announced in 2017 that almost 1,000 schools in the mainland would be paired with Tibetan schools in Tibetan areas of Sichuan to help the Tibetan schools “to change their educational philosophies.”⁴¹

The imperative of “listening to the Party, following the Party”⁴² is emphasized in training for these Tibetan students in mainland China. A state media report referred to more than 10,000 Tibetan students in 20 provinces of the PRC who had received “ethnic unity education” to drive home the message of gratitude to the CCP, referring to Tibetans at schools in Wuhan, Zhangzhou, and Fujian.⁴³

4.4. “Patriotic education bases” for youth

In another long-term initiative of “Party-building”, the CCP has set up sites for “patriotic education”, often in museums which promote the CCP version of history. Often these facilities are set up at sites associated with “revolutionary” “red” culture, which can be places where there were massacres of Tibetans or other incidents connected to China’s invasion and takeover of Tibet from 1949 onwards and so have deeply painful resonances for Tibetans.⁴⁴

China’s policies on Tibet today build from an era of mass incarceration and killings at an earlier stage of its incorporation into the PRC, in the 1960s, after uprisings and armed resistance across the plateau. The extent and scale of the violence and devastation was revealed only years later, and is still

not fully documented, as it took place during the Cold War with no global audience or immediate and widespread means of communication.⁴⁵

It is this history that the Chinese leadership seeks to erase from Tibetan minds, and redefine in CCP terms to a younger generation as a story of heroic “liberation” by the PLA. The “patriotic education bases” are part of this process. In November 2020, the establishment of a batch of ten “patriotic education bases” for youth were announced in Qinghai Province, including a Memorial Hall for Chinese Workers and the Red Army (PLA). One of the centres for youth is set up in the Qinghai Atomic City Museum, on the shores of Tso Ngonpo (Qinghai Hu in Chinese). China’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs were designed and developed in the so-called Ninth Academy amid extreme secrecy in the 1950s and 1960s, and its research led to the detonation of China’s first atomic bomb in 1964.⁴⁶ The site was decommissioned in 1987, becoming a site for “red tourism” and later, designated as an official “patriotic education” base.

The bases are intended to “further strengthen the education of patriotism and revolutionary tradition among the youth in Qinghai Province, carry out the revolutionary culture and inherit the red gene, and promote the extensive, in-depth and lasting development of patriotic education activities for new generations. [...] The next step is to actively carry out all kinds of group patriotic education sessions that are suitable for a younger generation, and strive to build a solid youth patriotism education base to cultivate and train a new and enthusiastic younger patriotic generation.”⁴⁷ In a training programme established for primary schools, a Chinese official stated that more than 3,000 students in Lhasa had been educated in “socialist core values” and “love for the Party”.⁴⁸

Even the Potala Palace, former home of the Dalai Lama before his escape into exile in 1959 and seat of the Tibetan government, has been repurposed as a “patriotic education base”. A state media report depicted a visit of teachers and schoolchildren to the Potala, which has a deep symbolic significance for the Tibetan people as “the soul of Tibet”. The official report declared that: “Through the training of lecturers and speech contests, students can gain a deep understanding of the history of old Tibet”⁴⁹ – meaning the Chinese official version.

Any discussion of history outside parameters set by the CCP is almost impossible, and described as a “distortion” of history. This is mentioned in new regulations demonstrating the tightening crackdown against online activity, published in December 2020 and announcing criminal prosecutions against individuals who use online communication tools to “split the country” and “undermine national unity”. A notice dated 24 November 2020 stated that in order to “strike hard against illegal and criminal activities of using information networks”[...] It is not allowed to publish and spread information that distorts history, dilutes national consciousness, uses religious content, religious activities, etc. to attack the party and state policies, and slander the socialist system.”⁵⁰

According to Article 19(1) of the ICCPR, all forms of expression are protected, be they political, religious, historic, scientific or moral.⁵¹ The Human Rights Committee has stated that laws that penalise the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and expression. The Human Rights Committee has stated that “The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.”⁵²

Previously, a younger generation of Tibetans would have learnt about their country’s history – the Chinese invasion, the horrors of the Cultural Revolution, the destruction of monasteries and nunneries, the reasons for the Dalai Lama’s escape – through older generations in the privacy of the family home, or from elders at their monastery. Cutting off these transmissions has been identified as a priority, reflected in the objective of breaking the roots and connections at the heart of Tibetan Buddhist beliefs and civilisation, involving the intangible as well as tangible elements that form an identity.

5. LABOUR TRANSFER PROGRAMME AND RESTRUCTURING OF RURAL COMMUNITIES

KEY FINDINGS:

- Between 2015-2020, official media claimed that over 2.8 million farmers and herdsmen in Tibet were “transferred” from the agricultural sector to secondary and tertiary industry in urban areas, with 604,000 transferred in 2020 alone.
- In the TAR, there are 147 enterprises in the “vocational skills training industry” operating as of the beginning of 2019 and 332 – twice as many – were found in Qinghai, until the end of 2018.
- There are a particularly high number of vocational training bases in the strategically important area of Chamdo (Chinese Qamdo) in the TAR, described as “combat-ready” and on the frontline of the authorities’ “patriotic education” efforts.
- There is a proliferation of vocational skills training institutes and enterprises in the heavily militarized region of Nyingtri (Chinese: Linzhi or Nyingchi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the TAR, across the border from Arunachal Pradesh in India.
- The programme targets current and former Tibetan prisoners, alongside herders and farmers, to “ensure stability”, tackle them being “a burden” to the Party and help them “strive to become good citizens.”
- Political re-education is at the heart of the programme and is always required. In some centers, it occupies the majority – 70% – of the training focus.
- The programme is focused on developing low-level skills and does not develop or advance sustainable Tibetan livelihoods where Tibetans hold a comparative advantage, such as woollen products, dairy goods.
- The “labour transfer” process is being used to further erode Tibetan language education.

5.1. The background: mass displacement and relocation

Massive urbanization in Tibet, which has a predominantly rural population, is a key mechanism of Party policy designed to meet economic objectives but with the political agenda of integrating Tibetans into the PRC, undermining “ethnic autonomy” and ensuring CCP control. Urbanization is the central means of enabling the Party’s policies for poverty alleviation and economic growth.⁵³ In Qinghai, China is implementing plans of urbanizing nearly half a million people, creating new transport and communications infrastructure, with seven new cities.⁵⁴ This is intended to create a more manageable population, with a population that can be more easily monitored, subject to high-tech surveillance by China’s state security apparatus. In addition, city life lends itself more to inter-ethnic “mingling” (Chinese: *jiaorong*) with Han Chinese.

In Uyghur areas too, the imposition of urbanisation is used as a means of undermining ethnic cohesion and identity. The CCP has overseen the destruction of Uyghur neighbourhoods and villages across East Turkistan, including in whole or in part, of the old cities of Khotan, Yarkand, Kargalik, and Keriya.⁵⁵ As with Tibetans, it is connected to the efforts to turn Uyghurs into wage labourers, diverting them from subsistence farming, small businesses, and independent trading.

The vehicle for the transformation of rural areas is the Party state’s “poverty alleviation” programme, a massive top-down scheme across the PRC that is inseparable from securitization in both Tibet and East Turkistan. As in Uyghur areas, indoctrination, ideological training, and increasingly intrusive surveillance are integral to the “poverty alleviation” industry, which extends the government’s social control deep into people’s lives. In Party-speak, it is described in militaristic terms as a “battlefield,” with the work to be organized under a military-like “command” structure.⁵⁶ The connection is made explicit in numerous state media outlets; in one Tibetan area, Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan, the state media Ganzi Daily referred to the gratitude of “the masses” to the People’s Liberation Army in its deployment in the “special battle” against poverty. Deployment of the PLA in this way is a “concrete manifestation of [...] the purpose of the People’s Liberation Army, and as an effective way to do a good job of maintaining stability.”⁵⁷

In September 2020, it came to light that the Chinese government has overseen a region-wide “labour transfer” policy in the TAR which has resulted in over 500,000 Tibetans being transferred, mostly



Screenshot of an official media report from 7 February 2021, depicting an example of China’s discourse on improving Tibetan lives through settlement and labour mobilization programmes, which aim to consolidate Party control and remodel rural landscapes.

within the TAR.⁵⁸ The programme involves shifting mainly farmers, herders, and other rural workers into training programmes that reflect the CCP's emphasis on the dominance of the urban, industrial economy. The programme is being used to further political indoctrination, undermine cultural identities, and expand surveillance measures – including promoting the “spying” of Tibetans on each other through the “grid management system” and “double-linked household system”.

Beijing's efforts to counter this narrative and showcase “poverty alleviation” may have been a factor in an invitation to China-based correspondents for global media to visit Tibet in November 2020, incorporating a visit to a vocational training centre reminiscent of escorted, stage-managed trips to Uyghur internment camps. During the trip, a group of foreign correspondents were invited to Tibet⁵⁹ and visited “poverty alleviation” sites in Tibetan areas of Gansu, with reported statistics given by officials of 628,000 people in the TAR lifted out of poverty. CCP members were cited saying the Party is “unbelievably kind”.⁶⁰ They visited Tibetan homes adorned by photographs of Xi Jinping and earlier Chinese leaders (in some areas Tibetans have been compelled to prostrate to these images). They observed signboards by water taps in small courtyards that proclaimed: “Don't forget President Xi when drinking water; forever be grateful to the Communist Party.”⁶¹ Reports highlighting the “gratitude” of rehoused Tibetans since 2006 have become a prominent theme in state media.⁶²

5.2. Alarming official figures on labour transfer as an element of rural remodeling

The scale of the efforts involved in “mobilizing” and “transferring” rural Tibetans is an important demonstration that the driving force of the CCP's control agenda in Tibet is the practical restructuring of rural life through relocation and other livelihood patterns, disrupting and dismantling communities, and uprooting Tibetans from rural livelihoods into the mainstream and urban economy. Although the majority of Tibetans live in rural areas, policies in Tibet are based on an urban industrial model and imposed from the top down. The transformation of rural livelihoods, involving mass relocations, was emphasized in the 13th Five Year Plan (2015-20) as well as for the coming decade.

Official state media reported that in 2020 alone, 604,000 Tibetan farmers and herders have been “transferred” to alternative employment, stating that “Many young and middle aged farmers and herders in Tibet have put down their rakes, and walked into cities and towns to become industrial workers and service personnel.”⁶³ According to the regional Department of Human Resources and Social Security, a further 700,000 farmers and herders in the TAR will be assisted in finding jobs in 2021.⁶⁴ When looking at a broader timeline, the official statistics provided are even higher. **In February 2021, the Chinese authorities stated that over the past five years, 2.839 million farmers and herdsmen in Tibet – more than two-thirds of the entire population of the TAR – have “transferred employment” and a total of 366,000 farmers and herdsmen have received training.**⁶⁵

It is important to note that these figures are likely to be inflated and aspirational, as local officials struggle to claim success by meeting the ambitious quotas and objectives set by Beijing and the regional leadership.⁶⁶ In addition, implementation of the programme may not apply in a uniform manner and the reality on the ground varies considerably from area to area. In addition, the figures given are often confusing and at odds with other official statistics on numbers of rural workers in Tibetan areas. According to the Tibet Autonomous Region 2020 Statistical Yearbook the number of “rural labourers” in TAR was 1,426,000, mostly in farming and pastoralism, but including 160,000 rural TAR residents in construction.⁶⁷

Tibet Advocacy Coalition has monitored a network of hundreds of facilities and enterprises described as providing “vocational training” associated with the labour transfer programme – including in prisons and with released prisoners, along with militarized and expanded detention facilities in the heart of Tibetan communities. New documents obtained from the PRC give details of 147 enterprises in the “vocational skills training industry” in the TAR operating as of the beginning of 2019.



Journalists on a press tour to the plateau in 2020 were taken on a sanitized, stage-managed visit to a vocational training school in Nyingtri (Chinese: Linzhi) in the TAR, one of the most heavily militarized areas on the plateau. This image shows young women on a “tea appreciation” course, shot by Channel News Asia for their broadcast on 20 November 2020.

There are more than twice as many centres in Qinghai – with the same directory of files listing 332 vocational skills training industry enterprises in the province, and that was only up until 2018.⁶⁸ While enterprises on the TAR list are mostly based in county towns or township headquarters according to their addresses, some on the Qinghai list are based in villages. Most enterprises on both the TAR and Qinghai lists (particularly the TAR ones) started providing the training programmes over the past decade. They are mostly non state-owned enterprises (although such enterprises would still have strong Party affiliations).

On both the TAR and Qinghai lists of enterprises providing vocational skills programmes, tuition in driving appears to rank the highest. Many enterprises on the lists do not specify programmes they provide, but just state their function as vocational training. On the TAR lists, some specific programmes include wooden furniture making, catering services, computer operation, hairdressing, thangka painting and employment training for the disabled.

The strategically important area of Chamdo (Chinese Qamdo) in the TAR, described as “combat-ready” and on the frontline of the authorities “patriotic education” efforts,⁶⁹ has a particularly high number of vocational training bases. It is intended to serve as a model for the “vigorous promotion of military-style[...] vocational training” throughout the TAR.⁷⁰

There is a greater diversity of training on the Qinghai list, perhaps reflecting the development of the region as a high tech industrial centre aiming to attract high levels of investment from outside the province in the PRC and internationally. Deputy Head of the Department of Science and Technology of Qinghai government Su Haihong recently referred to “extensive international scientific and technological cooperation with Italy, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, Russia, Germany, Uzbekistan and Norway in more than 10 fields, including ecological protection, livestock breeding, endemic disease prevention and control, water resources survey, new energy and new materials.” Qinghai also cooperates in various fields with the European Union, with a “China-EU scientific research cooperation project” launched in 2020.⁷¹

These vocational enterprises and centres are linked to Party cadre training mechanisms, as officials working at “grass roots” level are required to undergo training with an ideological emphasis even if they are involved in specific vocations in rural villages, such as medicine or agriculture. Retired

cadres are not exempt either. A state media article from Qinghai refers to the various strands of “Party building” mechanisms for cadres and CCP members in the province, which include “140 theoretical education courses centred on the study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and a “Cadre Academy” that focuses on training rural cadres in pastoral areas. The same report also refers to a “Plateau Pioneer Teachers Bank”, a database of 120 grass roots Party members including teachers and scholars who combine technical talents with the requisite “strong political quality” and “high theoretical level”.⁷²

Government documents viewed by Tibet Advocacy Coalition also confirm that Party cadres take the lead in the transfer of nomads and herders from rural areas into urban areas. In a detailed document published by the Shigatse (Chinese: Rigaze) government, for instance, it was specified that: “In Lhasa, Ali [Ngari], Nagqu [Nagchu] and other regions [of the TAR], strengthen communication with local labour organizations and employers, establish long-term and stable labour cooperation relations, create transfer employment cooperation bases, and carry out job information collection, labour docking, labour management, organizational output, etc.”⁷³

Types of training too are not uniform and last for different periods; one document obtained by Tibet Advocacy Coalition referred to training in steel manufacture for prisoners (which could be linked to the construction of the strategic rail network currently under construction from Lhasa to Sichuan and other hard infrastructure projects) while another referred to teaching workers to make noodles as part of a “breakfast club” training. There are differences too between Uyghur areas and Tibet in the levels of securitization at facilities used for labour transfer; in Tibet, this varies and while Uyghurs are incarcerated in large prison camps, labour and training in Tibet are often carried out for periods of around 60 days, and are not necessarily residential.

Interestingly, terminology used for the labour transfer scheme in Tibet is similar to that used in relation to East Turkistan’s labour transfers, employing phrases such as: “supra-regional employment transfer”⁷⁴ and “labour export”. Despite this, there are far fewer Tibetans transferred out of the TAR, compared to Uyghur workers sent to factories elsewhere in the PRC. Notably, both the 2019-2020 Training and Labour Transfer Action Plan and the TAR’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) only mention transfers outside the TAR in passing, without outlining a detailed related policy or the use of terminology akin to that found in related documents from Xinjiang. Other figures detail that in 2020, 3,109 Tibetans were transferred to other regions.⁷⁵ Sometimes local authorities in the TAR give separate figures for their own area; in 2018 the authorities in Pome (Bomi) county in Nyingtri boasted that they had created



TAR Party chief Wu Yingjie on a visit to Chamdo (Chinese: Chengdu) in the TAR, a region of particular strategic significance for the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet and on the frontline of political education efforts. During the visit Wu Yingjie visited the Changdu Revolutionary History Museum. © October 2020, Tibet Daily.

employment for thousands of farmers and herders through vocational training in 2018, including transferring 1000 Tibetans from rural areas to Guangdong in southern China.⁷⁶ In comparison, scholars have documented the transfer of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs to other provinces in the PRC.⁷⁷

One reason for the different approach and strategies in Tibet is that there is a much larger and more concentrated potential workforce in East Turkistan and a stronger industrial economy. East Turkistan has closer ties to Xi Jinping's Belt and Road project, as part of its component "Silk Road Economic Belt", given its geographical location, population and greater accessibility. Two of the six economic corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) go through East Turkistan, and it has been described as a BRI "hub". In the TAR the "labour transfer" workforce does not have the same connection to global supply chains.

While the scale of labour transfer from Tibet to other parts of China is far lower than the numbers of Uyghurs being sent to factories and industrial complexes elsewhere in the PRC, the potentially permanent and profound changes in modes of livelihood associated with the programme are devastating to Tibetan rural communities. While the mass labour transfer schemes are targeted primarily at the rural population, young educated Tibetans are actively encouraged to study and work elsewhere in the PRC. Graduate students will commonly apply for vacancies across China offering work in business, construction and many other sectors. Tibetans who excel in Tibetan language and subjects such as history are encouraged to move into other vocations, according to a Tibetan from the eastern Tibetan area of Amdo, who gave examples of students he knew who had joined the police or other professions.⁷⁸

5.3. Highly skilled Tibetan herders and farmers framed as "unskilled", "surplus" labour

It is notable that these mass mobilisation schemes targeting Tibetans in rural areas do not develop or advance – and indeed actively reverse – sustainable Tibetan livelihoods where Tibetans hold comparative advantages, such as woollen goods, dairy products, livestock and others. Instead many of those trained are transferred to low-skilled, low-paid jobs, such as textile manufacturing and construction.

Government policy refers to Tibetan pastoralists, herders and farmers as "rural labourers" or "surplus rural labourers", rather than highly skilled individuals and entrepreneurs able to manage unpredictable conditions and in charge of their families, their livestock, their enterprises, also demonstrates the Party state perception that guides policy.⁷⁹ The official propaganda is that they are unskilled, requiring "education" and socialisation, and should be removed from the land and shunted into urban labour.

The very existence of a "surplus" number of labourers exists due to decades of Party-driven mass campaigns to displace nomadic herders from their land and remove sustainable rural livelihoods. For instance, under a policy known as "Comfortable Housing", according to official figures, two million people were moved into new houses or rebuilt their own houses between 2006 and 2012 in the TAR. Twenty percent of those rehoused between 2006 and 2010 – about 280,000 people – had to be relocated, some nearby and others at a distance.⁸⁰ According to more recent statistics, a further 252,000 people were relocated in 934 "relocation areas for poverty alleviation" in the TAR by the end of 2019.⁸¹

In Qinghai province, which led the way in nomad settlement, official statistics state that more than 90 percent of the herder population of the province has been "sedentarized", meaning they have been moved off the land and into permanent structures. Policy in Qinghai has been used as a template for relocating and "settling" Tibetan communities in other Tibetan areas in the TAR, Sichuan and Gansu.



This new concrete block in the Lhasa area is typical of those created for the relocation of farmers and herders from rural areas into urban landscapes. Name of photographer withheld upon request.

Descriptions of the Tibetan landscape as a dry and inhospitable “wasteland” serve mainly to advance and justify the policies and interventions of the Chinese state in Tibet. In official Chinese terminology, the term “contiguous destitute areas”⁸² is a territorial zoning that rests on the assumption that Tibet, because of its altitude, thin air and low temperatures is naturally unproductive, and that no-one would choose to live in Tibet, if they had a choice.

5.4. An agenda of ideological indoctrination

Government documents make it clear that Tibetan rural labourers are targeted as a matter of course for ideological “training” from “[being] unwilling to move” to becoming “willing to participate”, a process that requires “diluting the negative influence of religion”⁸³ which is said to induce passivity. The programmes aim is to “strengthen[s] [the Tibetans] weak work discipline”⁸⁴ with religious belief being regarded by officials as an obstacle to effective “poverty alleviation”. In one Tibetan area, Golog (Chinese: Guoluo), Qinghai (the Tibetan area of Amdo), the authorities warned that Xi Jinping’s instructions must be followed in order to “transform” Tibetan Buddhist views and to “educate and guide religious figures and believers to respond positively to the call of Party Committee and government” in order to “meet the actual situation of poverty alleviation in Guoluo Prefecture”.⁸⁵

Tibet Advocacy Coalition reviewed further policy documents to better understand the extent of ideological re-education that is incorporated into the training programme. While application of it may be more zealous in some facilities than others, **ideological indoctrination is always required and in some centers, may even comprise the majority of the training focus. For instance, one policy document from the Shigatse (Chinese: Rigaze) government, for example, indicates that no less than 70% of time should be allocated to “order-based” class hours.**⁸⁶

5.5. Masking an expanded surveillance programme

Established means of political indoctrination are supported by increasingly intrusive technological tools of oppression in Tibet. The term “three-dimensional [social stability] preventive control system” used as the bedrock of this approach emphasizes the integration of multiple information systems.⁸⁷

In 2020, it was announced that a new big data centre, the world's highest, was trialling operations after completion of the first phase of construction. The state media reported that the Ningsuan cloud computing data centre in a high tech zone of Lhasa would "meet the data storage needs of the country and South Asian nations like Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan", but further scrutiny of official sources confirms that the objectives of the centre go further. Head of Ningsuan Technology Hu Xiao specified that the data centre would be an integral element of surveillance and preventive control in the region, subject to control and oversight from Beijing. Hu Xiao gave the example of a criminal suspect who might be seeking to evade detection, saying that facial recognition and other tracking technology available at the centre, integrated with policing, would enable the apprehension of the criminal.⁸⁸ This data centre builds on the intensive surveillance capability already operational in the TAR with systems introduced since 2011 involving big data and machine learning analysis that aggregates data about people, usually without their knowledge, using this to surveil every aspect of people's lives.

The new tech developments further advance the "iron grid" and "double-linked household" schemes. The latter, established in the TAR in 2013 and later extended to Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo, is a tool for surveillance and income generation among groups of households, involving schools and monasteries as well as private homes. The "grid management" system, originally introduced into urban areas of the TAR in April 2012, immediately intensified surveillance and monitoring. While initially focused on particular groups under suspicion, such as former prisoners and those returned from the exile community in India, it has been expanded to potentially target the entire Tibetan population.

State media report that the "double-linked household" system has been used as the vehicle to expand Chinese language learning for Party cadres as well as furthering the Party's securitization agenda. Between 2012 and 2016, state media reported that the TAR established 81,140 "double-linked households" covering over three million residents, which is virtually the region's entire population.

5.6. Imposing the will of the party

Tibetans have no say in the decision-making from the top-down in Beijing and policies imposed upon them. As with relocation and re-housing, the Chinese government asserts that all work placements are entirely voluntary and respect "the will of the Tibetan farmers and herders." While some work placements may be to an extent voluntary, and may be genuinely useful in developing skills such as learning how to drive (there are a high number of facilities providing such instruction), it is unlikely that rural labourers would be able to decline them. "In this day and age in Tibet, volition is at best a kind of delusion," wrote Tibetan writer Tsering Wooser.⁸⁹ Private enterprises, too, would most likely be required to accept specific quotas of workers or assist in placement logistics, given that connections with the CCP are required to function and thrive.

Key policy documents also state that cadres who fail to achieve the mandated quotas are subject to "strict rewards and punishments" and Chinese Communist Party officials are required to meet strict labour transfer targets and are instructed to "pressure" subordinates to meet their quotas. Tibet Advocacy Coalition discovered that in Lhoka, Dranang County [Ch: Shannan, Tibetan Autonomous Region], party officials are scored annually to track their success, while in Ngari [Ch: Ali, Tibetan Autonomous Region] Party officials are required to submit "weekly, monthly and quarterly" reports to ensure strict adherence to the quota system. Party officials who fail to meet these quotas are subject to punishment.

The goal of the scheme is to achieve Xi Jinping's signature goal of eradicating absolute poverty by increasing rural disposable incomes.⁹⁰ This means that Tibetan nomads and farmers must change their livelihoods so that they earn a measurable cash income, and can therefore be declared "poverty-free." Under Xi Jinping, "poverty alleviation" has become a core CCP policy, and its implementation is inextricably linked to the securitisation and "stability" agenda. The dominant Party narrative of poverty alleviation seeks to obscure the model of development that China is pursuing in Tibet, based on resource exploitation and infrastructure construction. This is increasing, rather than decreasing, Tibet's dependence on subsidies from the central government, especially in the TAR.

5.7. The dangers of Tibetan language erosion

Given the widespread efforts by the Chinese authorities to undermine the Tibetan language, it is not surprising that **numerous documents and policy statements reviewed by the Coalition testify to the mainstreaming of the Chinese language in the process of transferring Tibetans into the urban wage sector.** For instance, a detailed implementation report by the Shigatse (Chinese: Rigaze) People's Government in the TAR stated that: "Labour discipline, Chinese language and professional ethics" would be incorporated into the skills training curriculum in order to "further improve the Chinese language proficiency of labour in farming and pastoral areas, enhance labourers' sense of discipline in observing national laws and regulations and unit rules and regulations."⁹¹ Another official source in Tibetan draws attention to a village-based work team from the TAR Civil Affairs Bureau in Lhatse (Chinese: Quxia, Quxar) county in Shigatse (Rigaze) prefecture teaching the villagers Mandarin, particularly training and improving the pronunciation of 15-45 year olds who already have a basic knowledge of the language.⁹² These measures only serve to further heighten existing policies and practices aimed at marginalising the use of the Tibetan language and contribute to existing concerns regarding the possible extinction of the Tibetan language in the next few decades.⁹³

A Tibetan from the eastern area of Amdo who was educated in China and subsequently escaped into exile, said: "It is not that Tibetans do not want to learn Chinese. They do. My Chinese is just as good as my Tibetan and both languages are important to me. We need and want to learn through our mother tongue, and to keep their religious and cultural heritage alive through our own language. Even though Beijing may not have the intention of enforcing the extinction of the Tibetan language, it is creating the conditions for its obliteration."⁹⁴

Ensuring Tibetans speak Mandarin has become a focus of political campaigning, and Party cadres in some areas are required to carry out spot checks on Chinese language fluency. In Chamdo (Chinese: Qamdo), the "promotion of the National Language (Mandarin)" is taken as an important political task. Cadres and local people are required to: "adhere to the daily learning practice of no less than two hours per person, and through daily spot checks, oral test and other lessons, supervised and guided by the village based party cadres using national language (Mandarin) to improve communication ability to adopt rapid social economic development."⁹⁵

In the educational system, while China describes the language policies in Tibet as "bilingual education," far from promoting the teaching of academic content in two languages, this measure has resulted in the replacement of Tibetan with Chinese as the medium of instruction in primary schools throughout the region, with the exception of classes studying Tibetan as a language.⁹⁶ Even informal groups for studying Tibetan, often known as "pure land" groups, are described as illegal. In a troubling new development, on 20 January 2021, Shen Chunyao, director of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, found that local legislation requiring ethnic schools to teach in ethnic languages was "unconstitutional".⁹⁷

When it comes to the prison system, there is also an emphasis on teaching Chinese language to Tibetan prisoners. Courses and tests in Chinese language have been added to labour training for prisoners in Powo Tramo Prison in Nyingtri (Ch: Linzhi) in the TAR with the local government website stating that the programmes "aim to help the inmates to reduce to commit new crimes and maintain social harmony and stability after they return in the society after their sentence".⁹⁸ It has been a cause of much distress that in many prisons, prisoner visits must be conducted in Chinese. In some cases, this means that elderly parents who do not speak Chinese cannot communicate with their children, Tibetan political prisoners, when they visit. According to former prisoners, in some detention facilities, prisoners are not even allowed to speak Tibetan to each other, except for brief asides in communal areas. According to another unofficial source, even before protests broke out across the plateau in 2008, more Chinese-speaking prison guards were being hired than before.⁹⁹

Tibetans who have expressed widespread concern about the marginalisation of the Tibetan language, have been subjected to arrest and prolonged prison sentences. Tibetan language rights advocate, Tashi Wangchuk was arrested in 2016 and sentenced to five years in prison after he featured in a

New York Times report about his plight to seek the right for children in Tibet to learn in Tibetan.¹⁰⁰ In September 2019, Sonam Palden, a 23-year old Tibetan monk, was arrested in Ngaba (Chinese: Aba), in Sichuan, after he posted a poem on WeChat expressing his sadness at the loss of the Tibetan language, and remains in incommunicado detention.¹⁰¹

5.8. Tibetan prisoners and vocational training

Tibetan herders and farmers are not the only group targeted for vocational training. The files on enterprises running training programmes also refer to vocational training for prisoners and released prisoners, which would include political prisoners. Former political prisoners are particularly targeted for “education” and surveillance as they are perceived as a threat to the state because of the views that led to their imprisonment in the first place. Discrimination, surveillance and poor health due to torture while in prison hamper efforts to find work or purpose upon release, while monks and nuns are not allowed to go back to their monasteries and nunneries. Over the past six decades, many former political prisoners would see no alternative but to escape into exile, but that route is now effectively closed. From 2008 far fewer Tibetans have been able to escape into exile due to more stringent and systematic securitization following the wave of protests across the plateau at that period.¹⁰² This has given rise to an expanded target population of former prisoners in Tibetan areas, particularly as many serving sentences following protests in 2008-9 have been released in recent years.

According to the files obtained by Tibet Advocacy Coalition, the Lhasa Xinxing Labour Skill Training Co. Ltd (detailed in the TAR list of vocational training centers mentioned above) was assigned to work with the Office of Lhasa City Resettlement to provide skills training for more than 10 released prisoners in Lhasa in 2015. The Lhasa Judicial Bureau emphasized the importance of remolding and “managing” the former prisoners as a priority above practical skills, stating that the course were carried out: “In order to further strengthen the service and management of people released from prison, strengthen education and training in relevant laws and policies [...] and implement the Party’s mass line [of education][...]” After the training, trainees were cited on an official website as saying that they would no longer be “a burden” to the Party and instead would “strive to become good citizens.”¹⁰³ In Qinghai, one training enterprise also offered training for 24 released and currently serving prisoners on machine operation “to further strengthen the education and help to released and serving prisoners” and to “ensure stability” in the region.¹⁰⁴



This image from state media shows released former prisoners in military fatigues in training at a vocational skills school in the Kumbum area, Qinghai.

Due to heavy restrictions on information and the consequences of sharing details about specific individuals incarcerated in Tibet, there are likely to be many more political prisoners than are known outside. In a rare recent insight, a Tibetan official from Lhasa told Human Rights Watch that according to internal information he had seen, there are 217 political prisoners in Chushur (Qushui) or TAR Prison No. 1 [at Nyethang township in Chushul county, near Lhasa], and that they are all people from Lhasa, or the nearby counties under Lhasa Municipality, arrested in the past few years. The source added: “People are continually being arrested for political reasons.”¹⁰⁵

The heavy emphasis on ideological training for prisoners is reflected in government notices about political campaigns carried out in various prisons. For example, the “Four Loves and Four Stresses” campaign, aimed at diluting the influence of religion in Tibetan society, was carried out at Powo Tramo Prison, TAR Prison Number Two, in Pome (Chinese: Bomi) county, Nyingtri (Linzhi).¹⁰⁶ This particular propaganda effort is focused upon the “Four Loves”, which are defined as “core interests” of the Chinese Communist Party; the motherland; one’s home town, and one’s livelihood, while the “Four Stresses” aims to generate admiration and loyalty for the Party and unity of the “motherland”. The campaign has been promoted in monasteries across the TAR, indicating the priority of ensuring compliance with CCP policy among Tibetan monks and nuns, and also in schools and higher education establishments.

There is a proliferation of vocational skills training institutes and enterprises in the heavily militarized region of Nyingtri (Chinese: Linzhi or Nyingchi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the TAR, across the border from Arunachal Pradesh in India (which China claims as part of the PRC). At least one of them trains prisoners from Powo Tramo Prison in Pome (Chinese: Bomi) county in techniques of steel manufacture, including steel bar welding, according to the WeChat account of the Nyingchi Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau on 12 December 2019. According to the account, the training would enable prisoners to “experience the care and warmth of the Party”, as well as maintaining “stability”.¹⁰⁷

It is not known if this specific training was targeted towards using prison labour for the new railway under construction from Lhasa to Nyingtri, part of the new strategic network currently under construction connecting central Tibet with Sichuan – which is likely to have an even more significant and detrimental impact on Tibetan areas than the Golmud-Lhasa route opened in 2006.¹⁰⁸ This strategic rail network, with two electrified, double-track high-speed rail links currently under construction in Kham and Amdo, are critical to China’s agenda of labour mobilisation, militarisation and poverty alleviation. Although the Chinese authorities have stressed that the railway will enable more tourists and help to alleviate poverty, the Lhasa-Nyingtri Railway is also a political priority because it will provide convenient access for China’s military in a region with extremely difficult terrain and very limited road access. The prefectural capital of Nyingtri, Bayi, is known as a base for the People’s Liberation Army.



This image of Chushur was captured from GoogleEarth in March 2021. Chushur (Qushui) Prison is a high-security facility that opened in 2005, on the road out of Lhasa to Shigatse (Chinese: Rigaze). Tibetans who are serving long sentences following the 2008 protests are likely to be held in Chushur.

6. PURGING RELIGION FROM THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF BUDDHISTS

KEY FINDINGS:

- Under Wu Yingjie’s leadership, there has been a new focus on separating the Dalai Lama from religion in the minds of Tibetan Buddhists, and separating “religion from life”, as Wu Yingjie phrased it. This shift represents a final, dangerous stage in the Party’s efforts to “Sinicize” Tibetan Buddhism and “control” Tibetan minds.
- In Tibet, disturbing accounts have come to light of torture, sexual abuse and imprisonment in specific “transformation through education” facilities targeting Tibetan monks and nuns for “correction”.
- Religious practitioners report being forced to denounce the Dalai Lama and memorize political CCP propaganda.
- Released monks and nuns have had their rights further restricted, included by being banned from re-enrolling with other monasteries or relocating elsewhere. As unaffiliated “mobile religious personnel” they are prevented from carrying out religious rituals in public in the TAR unless they have a special permit.

6.1. Wu Yingjie’s harsh crackdown on religion

The process of “breaking connections and roots” was originally trialled in Tibet under Chen Quanguo’s leadership when in 2012, hundreds of Tibetans were detained for “re-education” after returning from teachings by the Dalai Lama in India, in a systematic operation overseen by Chen Quanguo that involved keeping Tibetans under surveillance in India as well as tracking their return.¹⁰⁹ Previously, Tibetans had travelled in their thousands to teachings by the Dalai Lama in exile, including many elderly Tibetans spending life savings to be in the presence of the leader they know as Kundun (meaning “presence”) even just once in their lives. Three years later, in 2015, Chen Quanguo boasted that by then, “No one in the TAR had left the country to participate in religious teachings by the 14th Dalai Clique in foreign countries.”¹¹⁰

Now, an even harsher line has been adopted on religion led by his successor, Wu Yingjie, which goes further than the requirement to reject the Dalai Lama. **Under Wu Yingjie's leadership, the new focus has centered on separating the Dalai Lama from religion in the minds of Tibetan Buddhists, and separating "religion from life", as Wu Yingjie phrased it himself.** This shift in effect means the CCP intends to create a Buddhism shaped by the (atheist) Communist Party that entirely excludes the Dalai Lama and seeks to obliterate his influence with a younger generation – although religion and a deep connection to the Dalai Lama is integral to Tibetan identity. This effort is also, inevitably, focused on generations to come. The CCP seeks to create an environment in which they can maintain absolute control as the Dalai Lama ages and during, and beyond, the period of succession.

This shift represents a final, dangerous stage in the Party's efforts to "Sinicize" Tibetan Buddhism and "control" Tibetan minds. The CCP is saying that religious beliefs must not affect Tibetans' everyday lives or influence their social behaviour. Party Secretary Wu said that the imperative is: "To make efforts on Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism, effectively prevent and resolve major risks and challenges in the field of religion, and educate monks, nuns and religious believers to consciously distinguish between themselves and 14th Dalai Clique, and take a clear stand to eliminate negative influence of the 14th Dalai's manipulation of religion."¹¹¹

The campaign does not only target monks and nuns, but all Tibetans, in every sphere of society. At a meeting in Lhasa in October, Wu Yingjie referred to a phrase that is increasingly used in official discourse, the Party's focus on a "happy life" – again, a life that is separate to religion.¹¹² The message was that Tibetans should value "the happy life they now enjoy," focusing on the material benefits that the CCP states it has provided, rather than on spiritual practice.¹¹³ In Tibetan Buddhism, preparing the mind for death is regarded as an important element of religious practice which enables the individual to appreciate life more fully and maintain a positive and compassionate state of mind.

When a group of foreign correspondents were invited to Tibet in November 2020,¹¹⁴ provincial governor Che Dalha (Chinese: Qi Zhala) was cited as telling the journalists: "Don't overdo religion. Tibet has some bad old habits, mainly due to the negative influence of religion that emphasises the afterlife and weakens the urge to pursue happiness in the current life." Che Dalha concluded by affirming CCP priorities in Tibet – enforcing its development model and changing Tibetan minds at the same time – when he said: **"In Tibet, we'll need not only to feed the stomach, but also fix the mind."**¹¹⁵

The resources devoted to methodologies of "controlling the mind" appear to be consistent with an acknowledgement over the years at the highest levels of the Party that it has not yet fully secured the allegiance of officials or the broader Tibetan public. The CCP realised that without completely controlling Tibetans' thinking – described by one Party cadre as the "consciousness sphere"¹¹⁶ – the mission of achieving the desired "long term stability" – in effect, complete compliance with the CCP – would be impossible. The importance of the intent to remodel individuals as well as livelihoods and landscapes from an early age is emphasized at the highest levels.

Official language used about efforts to "transform" individuals and change their thinking is striking. The Chinese state media report refers to the importance for Party cadres of changing their attitudes not just at the superficial level of reciting Party slogans, but in terms of achieving a complete ideological shift. In a document about the training of Party cadres, descriptive terms like "sweaty face" were used to indicate that participants are required to have a level of emotional engagement with the process.¹¹⁷

Chen Quanguo emphasised that Tibetans' deepest loyalties and private thoughts are targeted for "re-education" when he announced punishments of Tibetan officials on political grounds aligned to the authorities' "anti-separatist" struggle, stating in 2014 that: "Those who have fantasies about the 14th Dalai Clique, those who follow the 14th Dalai Clique, and those Party cadres involved in supporting separatist infiltration and sabotage activities will be strictly disciplined and severely punished in accordance with the law."¹¹⁸ Two years later in East Turkistan, Chen Quanguo launched a campaign against "two-faced" officials who exhibit political disloyalty, resulting in the arrest of prominent Uyghurs such as the president of Xinjiang University.

Immediately before his transfer to Tibet, Chen Quanguo served as deputy party secretary in Hebei from 2009 to 2011, which was during the initial implementation phase of a campaign against the Falun Gong. The nature and extent of his involvement is difficult to assess, but eyewitness accounts from people detained in Henan during this period describe a variety of tactics intended to break prisoners' wills including sleep deprivation, forced feeding, being tied in contorted positions, and being forced to watch anti-Falun Gong videos. Camp wardens reportedly told prisoners that monetary rewards would be received for every Falun Gong believer successfully "transformed."¹¹⁹

6.2. "Transformation through education"

The concept of "re-education" in the PRC was established from the 1950s, most strongly epitomized by the "re-education through labour" (劳教, *laojiao*), or RTL, system. Although the Chinese government claimed the abolition of the "education through labour" system in 2013, it is possible that the "re-education" apparatus in East Turkistan alone now exceeds the entire former RTL system.¹²⁰ Through new facilities, infrastructure, technological means and personnel in Tibet, strategies of controlling the mind and behaviour have been developed further from the basis of "thought reform" techniques developed in the 1950s and '60s.¹²¹

This policy brief distinguishes between political or "patriotic" education which applies to every Tibetan in Tibet, and the Party concept of "correction" or "rectification", which seeks to break and shape the thinking of individuals specifically targeted by the CCP – such as monks and nuns expelled from monasteries and nunneries, political prisoners, or those critical in any way, however moderate, of the Party state.

In Tibet, while nothing on the scale of methods applied to the Uyghurs or Falun Gong devotees has been monitored, new and disturbing accounts have recently come to light of torture and imprisonment in specific facilities, likely to be related to the overhaul of the "reform through labour" system in the PRC.

A monk's testimony of torture and sexual abuse in the TAR, which reached Tibetan exiles in 2018, is the most detailed insight so far obtained into the nature of specific facilities for "correction" and "rectification" in Tibet. The monk said he was held in a facility which he described as a "transformation through education" "prison" in Sog (Chinese: Suo) county, Nagchu (Naqu) Prefecture in the TAR for four months. The only form of "education" he received were attempts to neutralize and eliminate faith in the Dalai Lama. The monk said: "We had to attend classes. Lessons focused more on chastising us and denouncing Rinpoche [His Holiness the Dalai Lama]. Laws and regulations were taught superficially and there was little in legal education that could actually benefit us. [...] Witnessing a powerful nation [China] engage in secret denunciation campaigns against an elderly monk [His Holiness the Dalai Lama] living in distant land makes one cry and laugh at the same time."¹²²



This Google Earth image shows the former area of Trisam "re-education through labor" (RTL, or *laojiao*) facility in Lhasa. Although China closed down the RTL system in 2013, expert observers believed that the facility might still be being used as a compulsory education centre. In a report uploaded in March 2021, the Tibet Research Project led by Tom Jarvis indicated that Duilong RTL (the name under which it was initially discovered) may now be known as Duilong Compulsory Isolation and Rehabilitation Center and that it is in the same location as the facility listed as Trisam.



Before and after images of religious oppression in Tibet. This image from 2017 depicts the major Buddhist institute of Yachen Gar, prior to major demolitions and expulsions of thousands of Tibetan Buddhist nuns and monks. Nuns who studied here from the Tibet Autonomous Region may have been detained for “re-education” according to some sources. Name of photographer withheld.



This image from November 2020 of Yachen Gar in Sichuan, the Tibetan area of Kham, depicts the demolition of around half the monastic complex, with much of the lay residential area left intact and the survival of only a few meditation huts. Photo courtesy of E.C.

Classes were conducted in Chinese language and involved self-criticism sessions in the style of “struggle sessions” employed by Chinese during the early years of occupation in 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution and monks and nuns had to attend military drills. The monk said that due to being physically weaker, the older monks and nuns always became the target of beatings at the hands of the detention officers and that sexual abuse was a frequent occurrence in the centre: “Many nuns would lose consciousness during the [military] drills. Sometimes officers would take unconscious nuns inside where I saw them fondle the nuns’ breasts and grope all over their body.” He heard of incidents of nuns being raped.¹²³

In his account, the monk refers to these centres as “transformation through education” (Chinese: *jiaoyu zhuanhua*; Tibetan: *lobso yosang teyney khang*) training centres (with the Tibetan term inclining more towards “correction” or “rectification”). They are also described as “education and correction centres”, and are designed for the management of released or parole prisoners, not just former political prisoners or other political cases. The monk’s account, however, details that all inmates were monks and nuns except for “two or three laypersons”.

This account is consistent with other Tibetan sources known to Tibet Advocacy Coalition detailing sexual abuse at facilities used for “re-education” in the TAR, although these sources are scarce and with nowhere near the same amount of detail as the monk in Sog. According to one Tibetan source, in either the same facility in Sog or another in that county, a number of nuns were sexually abused and forced to disrobe. Upon release, they were sent home under conditions of house arrest.¹²⁴ Another source said that there had been a number of suicides by nuns following detention for “re-education”, although this information could not be confirmed.

In these accounts, the nuns had been forced to leave major Buddhist institutes in eastern Tibet and returned to the TAR. Similarly, the monk from Sog was among many other monks and nuns forced to return home and abandon studies in monastic institutions located outside the TAR; he had been pursuing his religious studies in Qinghai Province when he was ordered to return to Sog County or face severe consequences. This raises important questions about the fate of nuns and monks sent back to the TAR from the great religious institutes in Kham of Larung Gar and Yachen Gar, where many thousands of practitioners studied Buddhism until mass demolitions and expulsions.¹²⁵

The Tibetan source stated that the facilities were believed to be run at county level. It appears that rather than building new facilities, the authorities may be repurposing sites already in existence such

as government or PSB buildings. “The decision to expel the thousands of nuns and monks from Larung Gar and Yachen Gar was made at the highest levels,” the Tibetan said. “But when they arrive back in the TAR, there are no clear central instructions, so decisions about how to treat them are made at a local level. This means that their treatment can vary according to area. In places like Nagchu, Chamdo, Sog, the officials are very hardline as there is a crackdown in these places.”

This supports information from two Tibetan sources who spoke about monks and nuns forcibly returned to their birthplaces in the TAR and made to attend political re-education classes at extra-legal detention centres in their hometowns. This followed a new phase of thousands of expulsions of nuns and monks at the well-known religious institute of Yachen Gar in eastern Tibet in 2019. Tibetan nuns who broke down and wept reported being brutally beaten and told that they had to stay in detention for 18 months, while others would be released after six months. This alarming development bears comparison with the treatment of Uyghurs in internment camps in East Turkistan, where witnesses have testified to harsh punishment if they cry.¹²⁶ One of the Tibetan sources said that due to “overflowing numbers” at a detention centre in Jomda in Chamdo, “many have been sent to Chamdo city for political re-education.”¹²⁷

“As soon as they are brought to the detention centres, their cellphones are confiscated, rendering them incommunicado with the outside,” the source said. A second source based in southern India told RFA that some “70 monks and nuns are being held in Jomda and are undergoing thorough political re-education” after being summoned by police upon their return to their hometowns. The anonymous source also said: **“The monks and nuns are forced to wear the clothes of laypersons at the detention centre and the Chinese authorities make them denounce [Tibetan spiritual leader] the Dalai Lama on a daily basis, as well as memorize political propaganda, which they are later tested on. These monks and nuns could be held for political re-education for another several months before they are released to their families. After that, they will be restricted from re-enrolling with any other monasteries or relocating elsewhere.”**

No former monks and nuns who have been returned to the TAR are allowed to join any monastery or nunnery there, which means they are considered to be “mobile religious personnel.” Such unaffiliated monks and nuns are not permitted to carry out religious rituals in the TAR outside their own homes unless they have a special permit. Carrying out religious services for others would constitute their normal source of income, and it also means that Tibetans in the TAR face increasing difficulties in finding religious practitioners to recite prayers at funerals and other family events.¹²⁸

According to other reports, expelled monks and nuns sent back to the TAR have been compelled to study the Party’s mass programmes of subsidies and poverty alleviation for Tibetan nomads and farmers. A group of about 100 who came to Larung Gar originally from counties in the TAR and were sent back in August 2016, were held for two months in the TAR’s southeastern county of Nyingtri (in Chinese, Linzhi), a resident of the area told RFA’s Tibetan Service.¹²⁹ “The rehabilitation of those displaced monks and nuns requires the study of Chinese policy and regulations regarding Tibet,” RFA’s source said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

A video circulated on social media shows 25 young Tibetan women with shaved heads, who appear to be nuns, dressed in military jackets and standing in rows inside a police or government office decorated in Tibetan style. The women are chanting in unison, “The Tibetans and the Chinese are daughters of the same mother, the name of the mother is China,” part of a song often used by officials in Tibet to propagate the view that Tibetans are culturally Chinese. A photograph circulated at the same time shows the same women, dressed in full military fatigues, carrying out a military-style exercise inside a walled compound. The monk from Sog who gave the detailed account of the “correction” facility confirmed that he met women in military uniform (whom he later found to be nuns) at the center in which he was held who were ordered to learn by heart the same propaganda song.

A second video shows 12 Tibetan nuns dancing on the stage of a theater in front of what appears to be an audience of officials in Nyingtri, TAR. The nuns, dressed in religious robes, perform a choreographed dance routine to the song, “The Song of the Emancipated Serfs.” Buddhist nuns



This video, circulated on social media and uploaded onto YouTube shows young Tibetan women with shaven heads who appear to be nuns, dressed in military jackets and standing in rows inside a police or government office decorated in Tibetan style, apparently in Nyingtri (Chinese: Linzhi), the TAR. The women are chanting in unison, “The Tibetans and the Chinese are daughters of the same mother, the name of the mother is China,” part of a song often used by officials in Tibet to propagate the view that Tibetans are genetically or culturally Chinese. The timing and circumstances of the video indicate that the women pictured are Tibetan nuns expelled in 2016 from Larung Gar or Yachen Gar.



At around the same time, video footage emerged on social media which shows twelve Tibetan nuns dancing on stage to a propaganda song called “The Song of the Emancipated Serfs”. The use of forced singing and dancing as part of political re-education for expelled nuns is not known to have occurred previously in the TAR. “Buddhism is at the core of our lives, our philosophy, it is our nervous system and in our hearts,” says a former Tibetan monk. “Now they are trying to destroy what is most precious to us. They call it Sinicization.”

usually make a commitment to refrain from singing and dancing as part of their vows when ordained, so the use of such activities as part of political re-education would likely have the intention of being humiliating and distressing.¹³⁰

The accounts appear to be consistent with other rare anecdotal accounts on the existence of such extralegal centres used to educate Tibetans viewed as “politically unreliable”. For instance, Tibetan writer and teacher Gangkye Drupa Kyab was forced to attend 15-day “re-education” classes at Serthar (Chinese: Seda) detention centre soon after his release from prison in 2016, in order to “change his thoughts”.¹³¹ Likewise another former political prisoner was re-educated for more than two months for defying an official order that forced monks and nuns to leave monastic institutions located in Tibetan areas outside TAR.

In a second case, a prominent former political prisoner, Lodo Gyatso, who had been released from prison in 2013, was held in at Tsenda detention centre in Diru (Chinese: Biru) County for more than two months in 2016 for protesting the expulsion of monks and nuns from religious institutions located in Tibetan areas outside the TAR.¹³² An official source gives a specific figure for what appears to be a separate category of punishment for “re-education” or “correction”. The TAR authorities acknowledged at a press conference in 2019 that they had sent 174 people to “education and training”, as opposed to standard “criminal” detentions.¹³³

In another example of “re-education” being imposed as a specific punishment for a period of time, two Tibetans were ordered to attend political re-education classes on “issues of national security” for six months. Following involvement with a protest, a Tibetan man and his aunt who were imprisoned in Kardze (Chinese: Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan, after he recited prayers and called for the release of the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima.¹³⁴

7. CONCLUSION

This alarming new phase in Tibet of coercive assimilation aligns Tibet with the other major “ethnic minority” area of the PRC, East Turkistan. Both areas, which make up more than half of PRC territory, are of critical geopolitical significance. Bordering India and Pakistan, the region is a tri-nuclear junction and Xinjiang is a hub of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative connected to trade supply chains, while the Tibetan plateau is a climate change epicentre and source of Asia’s major rivers.

In order to achieve its aim of controlling the Tibetan population, encapsulated in the phrase “breaking lineage, breaking roots, breaking connections, and breaking origins”, the CCP is implementing a programme in Tibet of ideological indoctrination beginning at childhood, the restructuring of rural economies and a systematic intensification of data-driven policing and surveillance.

The new and more ambitious targets of “labour transfer” programmes documented in this report build upon Maoist style social engineering policies that have displaced tens of thousands of Tibetans from their land, removing their self-sufficiency and subjecting them to a new and more pervasive level of control.

While the mass internment in Uyghur areas has not been replicated in Tibet, the risk of imprisonment, torture and even death for moderate expressions of Tibetan cultural and religious identity or information sharing is now far higher than before. China’s hyper-securitization policies in Tibet are based on the principle of “stability maintenance” (*weiwen*), in order to achieve “long-term stability”. The assumption is that it is only through transforming every aspect of what it is to be Tibetan that long-term stability will be successfully maintained. The peaceful spontaneous protests of 2008 and the self-immolations that followed from 2009 onwards in Tibet have now largely been rendered impossible by a regime of complete surveillance, extreme controls on communication, and the extension of state presence to the rural grassroots.

Yet China’s success is not entirely assured. Despite the intensity and scope of China’s strategies and its proactive discourse on what it is achieving in Tibet, there is every evidence that Tibetans continue to demonstrate a remarkable resilience and skill in holding their ground and maintaining their deeply-rooted religious and cultural identity, even as the Party state drives deeper into private life. Major policy drives such as settlement and the removal of nomads from vast areas of Tibet claimed as national parks continue to be contested within the PRC. The zealous nature of political campaigns in Tibet also demonstrate how officials struggle to impose the CCP’s will, and expose uncertainties over the erosion of their authority.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

EDUCATION SYSTEM

Tibet Advocacy Coalition urges the Chinese authorities to:

- ▶ Immediately halt “political and militarised education” in the school curriculum, particularly for pre-school children, which aims to neutralise a sense of Tibetan identity from an early age.
 - ▶ Ensure that all Tibetan children are able to learn and use Tibetan language in all aspects of their school curriculum, from kindergartens upwards; and reverse the damaging “bilingual education policy” which has resulted in the replacement of Tibetan with Chinese, as the medium language of instruction in Tibetan schools.
 - ▶ Ensure that Tibetans schoolchildren are permitted to learn about their own history, culture and religion, including China’s invasion and occupation of Tibet.
 - ▶ End the imposition of “ethnic mingling” measures in Tibetan education and the placement of Tibetans in residential schools where they are “paired” with Chinese students for monitoring purposes and to further promote Chinese patriotism and undermine the Tibetan identity.
 - ▶ Ensure that promotion of “ethnic unity” does not violate basic civil and cultural rights and does not restrict the public debate in the educational system and elsewhere.
-

LABOUR TRANSFER SYSTEM, DISPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION:

Tibet Advocacy Coalition urges the Chinese authorities to:

- ▶ Immediately cease the “political re-education” of Tibetans as part of the large-scale system of “vocational training” and other similar training programmes.
- ▶ Immediately end the punitive quota system in the “vocational training” programme, which raises serious concerns around its voluntary nature and which places Tibetans at risk of forced labour.
- ▶ End the highly intrusive social control “grid management” (网格化管理, wanggehua guanli) system, the “double-linked household” (双联户, shuang lian hu) system, and other compulsory programmes aimed at surveilling and controlling Tibetans.
- ▶ Ensure that any and all vocational training programmes teach appropriate skills and are not merely designed for low-level/low-paid employment which are inadequate for involvement in the cutting edge technologies and the rapid remodeling of Tibet’s urban areas; and ensure that all Tibetans herders and farmers are afforded with opportunities to advance their livelihoods in areas in which they hold a comparative advantage, such as woollen products and dairy goods.
- ▶ Ensure Tibetans undertaking any vocational training are able to do so in the Tibetan language.
- ▶ Impose a moratorium on relocation and rehousing until an independent, expert review of existing policies and practices is carried out to determine whether they comply with international law. The review should assess all government policies that require or lead to the displacement and resettlement of rural Tibetans, confiscation of their property, or imposed slaughter of their livestock.
- ▶ Allow any Tibetan nomads and farmers coerced to give away their land and animal herds to state-run cooperatives as part of a “poverty alleviation” to return to their land and be given adequate compensation as required by Chinese law.
- ▶ Recognise and uphold the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association to ensure that Tibetans and others are able to engage in peaceful activities and raise concerns and criticisms, including of the Chinese government’s labour transfer programme, relocation and rehousing policies and practices.
- ▶ Immediately halt the “political re-education” component of all vocational training programmes designed for former and serving Tibetan prisoners, who are specifically targeted for “rectification” or “correction”.

CRACKDOWN ON TIBETAN MONKS AND NUNS

Tibet Advocacy Coalition urges the Chinese authorities to:

- ▶ Immediately halt the use of so-called “transformation through education” facilities which seek to rid Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns of their faith and eliminate any perceived loyalty to the Tibetan spiritual leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and immediately end the harassment and intimidation of all Tibetan Buddhist practitioners.
- ▶ Immediately conduct thorough and independent investigations into the reports of ill-treatment, torture and sexual abuse in “transformation through education” and other similar facilities, including, by not limited to, the facility in Sog (Chinese: Suo) county, Nagchu (Naqu) Prefecture in the TAR and bring those responsible for these crimes to justice through fair trials without recourse to the death penalty.
- ▶ Urgently provide information on the whereabouts of nuns and monks expelled from religious institutes in Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai and Gansu, who were returned to the TAR, given credible reports on their incarceration and torture in facilities where “re-education” is carried out.
- ▶ Provide statistics on how many Tibetans have been impacted by the demolitions and forced evictions at Larung Gar and Yachen Gar Buddhist monasteries in Eastern Tibet, and arrangements for re-housing them, as well as details of their welfare. The information should be made public and appropriate steps should be taken to allow for effective remedy and redress by affected individuals.
- ▶ Repeal or significantly amend the Criminal Procedure Law and Counter-Terrorism Law to ensure that criticism of government policy and practice, as well as other forms of protected speech, are not criminalised as “separatist,” “terrorist” or “undermining national unity”.
- ▶ Respond promptly and positively to any and all requests to visit China by UN Special Procedures and provide them with unrestricted access to Tibet, including the request by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief which has been outstanding since January 2003.

Tibet Advocacy Coalition urges International Governments to:

- ▶ Implement Magnitsky-style sanctions on Chinese officials and government bodies responsible for human rights violations perpetrated against Tibetans.
- ▶ Request full and meaningful access to Tibet conduct investigations into the alleged human rights violations taking place. So long as access is not granted, governments around the world should impose reciprocal travel restrictions on Chinese officials connected to these violations.
- ▶ Urgently express serious concern at all levels, including in bilateral discussions and through public statements, at the “political re-education” policies and practices carried out by the Chinese authorities in Tibet, including those targeting Kindergarten students, Tibetans undertaking “vocational training” and Tibetan monks and nuns.
- ▶ Take urgent joint and bilateral action concerning China’s policies and practices of social control, securitization and Sinicization in Tibet, posing a severe threat to the survival of Tibet’s culture, language, religion and identity.

Tibet Advocacy Coalition urges UN stakeholders and partners to:

- ▶ Support the establishment of an impartial and independent UN mechanism to monitor and investigate human rights abuses in Tibet in view of the urgency of the situation. Such a mechanism should have a mandate broad enough to cover the situation of freedom of expression, association and assembly, human rights defenders, as well as efforts to repress civil society in the country, including through repressive laws and tools of the justice system.
- ▶ Raise in relevant item statements at the UN Human Rights Council and issue joint statements at the Third Committee raising strong concern about:
- ▶ The imposition of militarized schemes of social control, securitization and Sinicization in Tibet, posing a severe threat to the survival of Tibet’s culture, religion and identity. State that the reach of these policies into private lives is unprecedented and unacceptable, and do not constitute genuine “poverty alleviation”. The imposition of a militarized training process with a heavy focus on ideology and Chinese language to the detriment of Tibetan, undermines any actual vocational training or local economic advantages and is counterproductive.
- ▶ The decision by the National People’s Congress in January 2021 that local regulations on the use and development of the spoken and written language of “ethnic minorities” is “unconstitutional;”¹³⁵ and reiterate the right of Tibetans to determine their own educational and cultural affairs, as provided for in international law and China’s Law on Regional National Autonomy.

NOTES

- 1 This term was used in various official documents to summarise objectives in Xinjiang, and equally apply to the CCP's strategies in Tibet. Cited by Adrian Zenz in 'Break Their Roots: Evidence for China's Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang', Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 2019, http://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/#_ftn145 Dr Zenz was citing an article on the Kashgar government website in Xinjiang dated 2 March 2018, archived at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20180813115300/http://www.kashi.gov.cn/Government/PublicInfoShow.aspx?ID=2851>. Also see Human Rights Watch, 'Eradicating Ideological viruses', 9 September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#_ftn232
- 2 Wu Yingjie, Party Secretary of the TAR, was speaking on 31 December 2020, at "a meeting of the Standing Committee of the District Party Committee to convey and study the spirit of the Central Rural Work Conference; to convey and study General Secretary Xi Jinping's important speech at the Democratic Life Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the politics of the CPC Central Committee". Tibet Daily, reproduced on an official social media (QQ) account, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/h6X53teYX3jtkZn0_v1o5g, archived at: <https://archive.vn/xQgyS>
- 3 A name for Chinese civilisation referring to cultural nationalism which is now the main thread of "ethnic" work for the CCP.
- 4 24 March 2019, http://epaper.chinatibetnews.com/xzrb/html/2019-03/24/content_881798.htm
- 5 OHCHR, 'UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China' 26 June 2020, [https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006#:~:text=OHCHR%20%7C%20UN%20experts%20call%20for,protect%20fundamental%20freedoms%20in%20China&text=GENEVA%20\(26%20June%202020\)%20%E2%80%93,of%20fundamental%20freedoms%20in%20China](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006#:~:text=OHCHR%20%7C%20UN%20experts%20call%20for,protect%20fundamental%20freedoms%20in%20China&text=GENEVA%20(26%20June%202020)%20%E2%80%93,of%20fundamental%20freedoms%20in%20China)
- 6 Human Rights Watch, 'The Costs of International Advocacy: China's Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms' 5 September 2017: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights>
- 7 International Campaign for Tibet report, 'Access Denied', 15 June 2020, <https://savetibet.org/access-denied-new-us-legislation-the-quest-for-reciprocity-in-europe-and-the-lockdown-in-tibet/>
- 8 OHCHR, View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998, China, available at: <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en>
- 9 OHCHR, View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998, China, available at: <https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en>
- 10 Human Rights Watch, 'China: Tibetan Tour Guide Dies from Prison Injuries Sentenced to 21 Years for Providing Information to Foreign Media' 16 February 2021: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/16/china-tibetan-tour-guide-dies-prison-injuries>
- 11 For instance, 'One App, Two Systems', CitizenLab, <https://citizenlab.ca/2016/11/wechat-china-censorship-one-app-two-systems/>
- 12 <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/second-07262016170418.html>
- 13 Tibet Daily, 10 February 2012
- 14 Some of these already existed nationwide, but most were particular to the TAR. A Uyghur woman who survived the camps in Xinjiang gave her impression of the immediate impact of Chen Quanguo's transfer from Tibet to Xinjiang. After ten years living in France, Gulbahar Haitiwaji was manipulated into returning to the PRC to sign some papers and locked up, "systematically dehumanised, humiliated and brainwashed" for two years. She writes in a new book: "The summer of 2016 saw the entrance of a significant new player in the long struggle between our ethnic group and the Communist party. Chen Quanguo, who had made his reputation imposing draconian surveillance measures in Tibet, was named head of Xinjiang province. With his arrival, the repression of Uighurs escalated dramatically. Thousands were sent to "schools" built almost overnight in the middle of the desert. These were known as "transformation through education" camps. Detainees were sent there to be brainwashed – and worse." The Guardian Long Read, 12 January 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/12/uighur-xinjiang-re-education-camp-china-gulbahar-haitiwaji>
- 15 'China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct Rule,' Human Rights Watch news release, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/china-tibetan-monasteries-placed-under-direct-rule>
- 16 'China: Alarming New Surveillance, Security in Tibet,' Human Rights Watch news release, 20 March 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/china-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet>
- 17 Original article from Tibet Daily, 30 August 2020, published at: http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100062/2020-08/30/content_12389373.shtml, archived at: <https://archive.vn/r3tcX>. The report states that the system has been expanded from the original 135 "convenient police stations" in Lhasa to 698 across the TAR.
- 18 Human Rights Watch, 'Tibet: A Glossary of Repression', June 2017, https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2017/06/20/tibet-glossary-repression#_ftn9
- 19 The Tibetan former monk, now in exile, is not named here for security reasons. He has interviewed a wide range of Tibetans from the plateau about their lives and experiences and maintains connections with relatives still in the PRC, including some who have direct experience of relocation and labour training.
- 20 Xinhua, 29 August 2020, <https://archive.vn/728he>
- 21 People's Daily, 24 November 2020, archived at: <https://archive.vn/0BAZn> m at a meeting in Lhasa of the Leading Group of United Front Work Department of Tibet Autonomous Region convened to "thoroughly implement the spirit of Fifth Plenary Session of 19th Regional Party Congress and Seventh Central Tibet Work Forum". Numerous official sources refer to the need for young people to "inherit the red gene" as part of their essential education. For instance, a state media report from Qinghai on 6 November 2020, stated the formation of new "patriotic education bases" in the province in order for young people to be able to "promote revolutionary culture, inherit the red gene, and promote the extensive, in-depth and lasting development of youth patriotism education activities". (<https://archive.vn/0i0B8>)

- 22 UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 7 March 1990, E/CN.4/RES/1990/74, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f03d30.html>
- 23 China Tibet News, 西藏军区机关幼儿园开展别样的爱国教育, 17 May 2020, <https://archive.vn/xqXMk#selection-345.0-345.296>
- 24 12 October 2020, http://www.tibet.cn/cn/index/edu/202010/t20201012_6867941.html and archived at: <https://archive.vn/DKsMG>
- 25 Gansu Daily, 4 January 2021, <http://gn.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2021/01/04/030247080.shtml>
- 26 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment no. 21, Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1a of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed35bae2.html>
- 27 Huatse Gyal, 'Our Indigenous Land is Not a Wasteland', 6 February 2021, American Ethnologist, https://americanethnologist.org/features/reflections/our-indigenous-land-is-not-a-wasteland?fbclid=IwAR05ujv_JWPxcK9Hj5m4UMLe7FTyXjvWBcU7kqfXQ_A8GT0V9MXjYs8V4c
- 28 Website of the Tibetan Education Department of the TAR, 28 December 2016, <https://archive.vn/vzCOB>
- 29 Tibet Daily via China Tibet Information Network, 11 May 2018, <https://archive.vn/yaK1y>
- 30 In a paper published in 2019 Dr Adrian Zenz writes: "Both speed and scale of preschool construction and related enrolment increases in Xinjiang's southern Uyghur majority regions were unprecedented in the entire nation. Between 2015 and 2018 and measured per population aged 0-5 years, preschool enrolment in three southern prefectures in Xinjiang with Uyghur majority populations rose by 148 percent, with Hotan Prefecture showing the highest increase (Figure 2). The enrolment growth for the entire XUAR was still over twice as high as Gansu Province, and far higher than most other provinces or the national average." 'Break Their Roots: Evidence for China's Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang', Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 2019, <http://www.jpolorisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang>
- 31 'Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Promoting the Development of the Western Regions in the New Era', http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020-05/17/content_5512456.htm, 17 May 2020.
- 32 For instance, a Xinhua article from Qinghai in 2012 reported that since 2009, "Qinghai Province has demolished and reconstructed a total of 1.7 million square meters of school buildings, accounting for 85.7% of the area investigated and identified; reinforced school buildings of 756,000 square meters, accounting for 32.9% of the area investigated and identified.[...] Expand the scale of boarding schools and build a new (expanded) 14.69 million square meters of school buildings, accounting for 89.9% of the planned area." Xinhua, 1 May 2012, http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2012-05/01/content_2127384.htm .
- 33 UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 7 March 1990, E/CN.4/RES/1990/74, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f03d30.html>, article 30.
- 34 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html>, article 27.
- 35 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Concluding observations on the second periodic report of China, including Hong Kong, China, and Macao, China, 13 June 2014, E/C.12/CHN/CO/2, para 36, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/53c77e524.html>; CERD/C/CHN/14-17 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions), adopted by the Committee at its sixty-fourth session (16 September – 4 October 2013), 4 October 2013, CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4, para 76(c) available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5263de9d4.html>; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, "Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: China" CRC/C/15/Add.56, para 40, 17 June 1996, https://tbinternet.ochcr.org/_layout/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolNo=CRC%2f15%2fAdd.56&Lang=en
- 36 Dr Adrian Zenz has observed that: "For the state, boarding schools provide the ideal context for a sustained cultural re-engineering of minority societies." 'Break Their Roots: Evidence for China's Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang', Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 7, No. 7, July 2019, <http://www.jpolorisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang>
- 37 China Tibet News Network, 22 January 2019, http://www.tibet.cn/cn/edu/201901/t20190121_6484772.html
- 38 For further details on the system and a compilation of official sources, see International Campaign for Tibet report, which cites an academic survey demonstrating that despite the intensive propaganda, the experience of studying in Chinese schools reinforced Tibetan students' sense of cultural identity. 12 January 2021, <https://savetibet.org/tibetans-sent-to-mainland-chinese-schools-under-guise-of-progress/>
- 39 Ibid
- 40 Aba (Tibetan: Ngaba) government website, posted 29 January 2019, http://www.abazhou.gov.cn/jrab/zwyw/201901/t20190129_1384595.html
- 41 "四川将选派 700 名优秀教师到 32 个藏区县支教" [Sichuan to dispatch 700 outstanding teachers to the 32 counties in Tibetan areas as teaching support], 18 February 2017, <http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/12771/2017/2/18/10414484.shtml>.
- 42 China Tibet Net, 3 December 2020, http://tibet.cn/cn/index/news/202012/t20201203_6911017.html . "Listening to the Party and following the Party" has become a political slogan, emphasized during "national unity education" in schools and workplaces.
- 43 The sessions were launched in 2013, according to the report in China Tibet.net on 1 December 2020, <https://archive.vn/NlpGA>
- 44 Conversely, the state media terms Tibet's "Red Tourist Sites" as "the places where Tibetans stood against aggression and where Tibet launched its peaceful liberation and democratic foundations." (Xinhua, 30 November 2009, <http://chinatibet.people.com.cn/6827352.html>)
- 45 The Chinese historian Jianglin Li provides detailed evidence from previously unseen Chinese records and interviews with Tibetan elders in her work. See blog with scholar Matthew Akester at: <http://historicaldocs.blogspot.com/> and her book 'Tibet in Agony: Tibet 1959', Harvard University Press, 2019
- 46 For an account of a visit, and the consequences for local Tibetans, see Mark McKinnon, 'Living the worry-free life in China's Atomic City', 13 August 2010, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/living-the-worry-free-life-in-chinas-atomic-city/article1377097/> Also see <https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/705/>

- 47 Qinghai Daily, 6 November 2020, <https://archive.vn/0i0B8>
- 48 7 December 2018, <http://www.lasariobao.com/lswb/pc/content/201812/07/c53560.html>
- 49 China News, 16 November 2020, <https://archive.vn/KLKYB>
- 50 Chinese and Tibetan language text from the state media, posted on 24 December 2020, <http://www.xztzb.cn/news/1608801210949.shtml>, cited by the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 28 December 2020, <https://tchrd.org/china-announces-strike-hard-campaign-against-online-activities-aimed-at-splitting-the-country-and-undermining-national-unity-in-tibet/>
- 51 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html>
- 52 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 34, Article 19, Freedoms of opinion and expression, 12 September 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed34b562.html>
- 53 As outlined in the CCP's National New-Type Urbanization Plan (2014-2020, launched in March 2014), which aimed to create more than 100 million new urbanites by 2020, and the Rural Poverty Alleviation Development Programme (2011-2020, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/16/content_14106364.htm)
- 54 Beijing News Express, 4 December 2017, <http://www.bjnews.com.cn/news/2017/04/12/439691.html>
- 55 Documented with before and after satellite images by @HomesUyghur
- 56 脱贫攻坚指挥部, tuopin gongjian zhihui bu, TAR Government, 29 October 2019; Xinhua, 7 October 2018.
- 57 Ganzi Daily, 15 February 2019, http://paper.kbcmw.com/html/2019-02/15/content_113794.htm
- 58 'Xinjiang's System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet' by Adrian Zenz, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 22 September 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/> Dr Zenz's analysis was reported by the Inter Parliamentary Coalition on China (IPAC) and Reuters, and was the subject of a Westminster Hall debate in the UK Parliament on 2 October (<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2020-0092/>). Dr Zenz's analysis was based on open source policy documents and state media reports, reflecting the difficulties of obtaining personal details of Tibetan lived experience in a closed society, due to factors including heightened controls on information flow and the dangers for Tibetans of any communication to the outside world.
- 59 The tour was intended to showcase poverty alleviation, and also likely to have been intended to counter and deflect the impact of Adrian Zenz's findings on "labour transfer" schemes two months earlier.
- 60 The Chinese state media reported that the delegation visited Tibetan areas of Gansu from 12 November 2020, stating that according to the Information Office of the Kanlho (Ganlho) Prefecture government: "The media delegation visited villages, households, farmhouses, bases and factories, interviewed grassroots Party cadres and masses, and recorded the great changes in the production and life of the masses and their sense of happiness since the implementation of poverty alleviation through the rural revitalization project". Archived at: <https://archive.vn/JSOzR>
- 61 The Times, 'How China has tried to buy Tibetans' loyalty' by Didi Tang, 23 November 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-china-has-tried-to-buy-tibetans-loyalty-9k5qrlzqp>
- 62 See Chinese government website, 2 January 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-01/02/content_2303892.htm and Human Rights Watch report, 'They say we should be grateful: mass rehousing and relocation programmes in Tibetan areas of China', <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/27/they-say-we-should-be-grateful/mass-rehousing-and-relocation-programs-tibetan>
- 63 Xinhua News Agency, Lhasa, 14 December 2020, reporting figures from the Tibet Autonomous Region Human Resources and Social Security Department, <https://archive.is/2gT9r#selection-553.0-553.330>
- 64 Xinhua, 7 February 2021, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2021-02/07/content_77196369.htm. Numerous statistics for the programme are given in the state media for different areas, for instance: "It is expected to complete the training task for 100,000 farmers and herdsman, achieve transfer employment of 600,000 people, and labour income of 4.2 billion yuan to ensure that the per capita disposable income of rural residents increases by more than 13%". 'Tibet: Strive to realize the transfer of employment of 600,000 farmers and herdsman by 2020', citing the Human Resources and Social Security Department of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Tibet Daily, 23 April 2020: http://hynct.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/xzsn/202004/t20200427_138635.html The report stated: "Tibet insists on increasing the income of farmers and herdsman as its core goal, broadens employment channels, strengthens skills training for farmers and herdsman and the training of wealthy leaders, and enhances employment for farmers and herdsman. Entrepreneurship capabilities will promote continuous income growth of farmers and herdsman." The Information Office of the Qinghai Provincial Government stated in November [2020] that they had "organized vocational skill training for 297,000 people" and that by the end of October 2020, 170,000 people had been transferred into employment. Qinghai Daily, 13 November 2020, https://epaper.tibet3.com/qhrb/html/202011/13/content_25768.html
- 65 People's Daily, Lhasa, 7 February 2021, using figures from the Department of Human Resources and Social Security of the TAR, <http://xz.people.com.cn/n2/2021/0209/c138901-34573359.html>, archived at <https://archive.vn/SuhEp>
- 66 See methodology section of this report.
- 67 TAR Yearbook 2020, table 8-1.
- 68 Fully updated files to 2020 were not available.
- 69 Chamdo is a strategically important area for the Chinese government. Following protests and resistance in 2008-9, the authorities stepped up "security work" in the region, including the use of "vigilante" squads, military drills and the imposition of more checkpoints to monitor people arriving in and leaving the area. International Campaign for Tibet report, 2 December 2019, <https://savetibet.org/determination-to-resist-repression-continues-in-combat-ready-chamdo-frontline-of-patriotic-education/>
- 70 Adrian Zenz details 45 such vocational training bases in Chamdo, set up in 2016, in his article for the Jamestown Foundation (<https://archive.is/fN9hz>). Dr Zenz cited '2019-2020 Farmer and Pastoralist Training and Labor Transfer Action Plan' (西藏自治区2019-2020年农牧民培训和转移就业行动方案, 'Xizang Zizhiq 2019-2020 Nian Nongmumin Peixun he Zhuanyi Jiuye Xingdong Fang'an') which mandates the "vigorous promotion of military-style...[vocational] training," adopting the model pioneered in Chamdo. Cited in 'Xinjiang's System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet' by Adrian Zenz, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 22 September 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/>
- 71 On 26 November 2020, the state media reported that: "The China-EU scientific research cooperation project began in Qinghai, which will provide scientific researchers in Qinghai with an opportunity to deeply understand European and related science and technology

- policies, and open up a new way for Qinghai to strengthen international cooperation and exchange with EU countries and improve innovation ability. Halldor Berg, a programme officer of the European Scientific Research Centre introduced the achievements of scientific and technological projects in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Norway. Officials from member states and local researchers in Qinghai discussed the sustainable development of medicine, food, agriculture, animal husbandry, climate and green energy development.” Qinghai Daily, 29 November 2020, <https://archive.vn/suyau>
- 72 13 October 2020, https://epaper.tibet3.com/qhrb/html/202010/13/content_20052.html
- 73 Website of the Rigaze Municipal People’s Government, <http://www.rkzsf.gov.cn/public-wj-detail.shtml?cid=8537>. The document announced the intention to: “organize the transfer of employment of farmers and herdsmen in an orderly manner, and strive to achieve organized employment of more than 50% of the labor force within 5 years, and achieve an increase of more than 20% in per capita labor income of farmers and herdsmen within 3 years.”
- 74 *Kuaquyu zhuanyi jiuye.*
- 75 Adrian Zenz cites Tibet Daily, 12 August 2020, <https://archive.fo/sOIQ2#selection-311.600-311.708>. He writes: “In the first 7 months of 2020, the TAR trained 543,000 rural surplus laborers, accomplishing 90.5% of its annual goal by July. Of these, 49,900 were transferred to other parts of the TAR, and 3,109 to other parts of China (TAR Government, 12 August). Each region is assigned a transfer quota. By the end of 2020, this transfer scheme must cover the entire TAR.” ‘Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet’ by Adrian Zenz, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 22 September 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/>
- 76 China Tibet Net, http://www.tibet.cn/cn/edu/201903/t20190319_6528064.html, 19 March 2018
- 77 A report by a group of academics from Nankai University in the Chinese city of Tianjin referred to ““targets” to be reached [in labour transfer], with Hotan Prefecture alone – at the time the study was undertaken – having already exported 250,000 workers, one fifth of its total working age population. [...] once they arrive in their new factory jobs, workers themselves are put under the “centralized management” of officials who “eat and live” with them.” The report by Chinese academics, which was archived by Adrian Zenz before being taken offline, also notes that the profound discrimination at the heart of the system is getting in the way of its effective functioning, with local police forces in eastern China so alarmed by the arrival of trainloads of Uighurs, that they are sometimes turned back (BBC report by John Sudworth, 3 March 2021, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-56250915> and report by Adrian Zenz, ‘Coercive Labor and Forced Displacement in Xinjiang’s Cross-Regional Labor Transfer Program’, Jamestown <https://jamestown.org/product/coercive-labor-and-forced-displacement-in-xinjiangs-cross-regional-labor-transfer-program/>
- 78 The Tibetan is now in exile; he maintains contact with friends in Tibet. Interviewed in February 2021.
- 79 The official TAR Statistical Yearbook designates all nomads and farmers as “rural labourers”
- 80 See Chinese government website, 2 January 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2013-01/02/content_2303892.htm and Human Rights Watch report, ‘They say we should be grateful: mass rehousing and relocation programs in Tibetan areas of China’, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/27/they-say-we-should-be-grateful/mass-rehousing-and-relocation-programs-tibetan>
- 81 6 December 2019, http://www.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx_406/shfz/201912/t20191206_125532.html
- 82 个集中连片特困
- 83 Zenz adds: “This is supported by a worrisome new scheme that “encourages” Tibetans to hand over their land and herds to government-run cooperatives, turning them into wage laborers.”
- 84 ‘Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet’ by Adrian Zenz, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 22 September 2020, <https://jamestown.org/program/jamestown-early-warning-brief-xinjiangs-system-of-militarized-vocational-training-comes-to-tibet/>
- 85 Golog (Chinese: Guoluo) government website, <http://www.guoluo.gov.cn/html/106/305950.html>
- 86 Website of the Rigaze Municipal People’s Government, <http://www.rkzsf.gov.cn/public-wj-detail.shtml?cid=8537>
- 87 An invaluable glossary of official terms by Human Rights Watch describes the ‘Three-dimensional [Social Stability] Preventive Control System’ (Tibetan: langz gzugs can gyi sngon ’gog tshod ’dzin ma lag ལངས་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་སྲོན་འགོག་ཚོད་འཛིན་མ་ལག་; Chinese: liti huà shèhuì zhì’ ān fāng kòng tǐ xì 立体化社会治安防控体系) as: “a policing system or monitoring network that includes digital surveillance; monitoring at the grassroots level carried out by cadres based in monasteries, villages, and local neighborhoods; and policing done by officials in grid management offices and by appointed representatives in “double-linked household” units.” Human Rights Watch, ‘Tibet: A Glossary of Repression’, June 2017, https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2017/06/20/tibet-glossary-repression#_ftn9
- 88 China Tibet News, 4 June 2020, <http://www.al.gov.cn/info/1034/28747.htm>
- 89 From Tsering Woesser’s essay, ‘Herders are strangers on their land’, from ‘Voices from Tibet: Selected Essays and Reportage’, Tsering Woesser and Wang Lixiong, edited and translation by Violet S. Law, p 50, Hong Kong University Press, 2014.
- 90 Work teams of Party cadres were later used in Xinjiang to identify Uyghurs who should be sent to internment camps. “In Tibet and now Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo lifted a strategy directly from the imperial playbook, with past colonial powers like England and Japan enlisting “native” populations to watch over their own people,” wrote Adrian Zenz and James Leibold in China Brief, the Jamestown Foundation. (‘Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang’, 21 September 2017, <https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/>). “Ethnic minorities have long served the CCP in China. However, the numbers of Uyghurs and Tibetans that have been recruited into China’s security apparatus under Chen far exceed public recruitments during the preceding decade and are potentially setting a historic record.”
- 91 Website of the Rigaze Municipal People’s Government, <http://www.rkzsf.gov.cn/public-wj-detail.shtml?cid=8537>. The document announced the intention to: “organize the transfer of employment of farmers and herdsmen in an orderly manner, and strive to achieve organized employment of more than 50% of the labor force within 5 years, and achieve an increase of more than 20% in per capita labor income of farmers and herdsmen within 3 years.”
- 92 http://tb.xzxw.com/sylm/syyw/201912/t20191213_2844245.html
- 93 Congressional-Executive Commission on China roundtable on the role of the Tibetan language in Tibet’s future: <https://www.cecc.gov/events/roundtables/teaching-and-learning-tibetan-the-role-of-the-tibetan-language-in-tibets-future>
- 94 Blog for the International Campaign for Tibet, <https://savetibet.org/publications/the-struggle-for-the-survival-of-the-tibetan-language/>
- 95 23 November 2020, http://xzcd.wenming.cn/shouye/cd007/202011/t20201123_6823557.shtml
- 96 Human Rights Watch report, 4 March 2019, ‘China’s “Bilingual Education” Policy in Tibet’, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/03/04/chinas-bilingual-education-policy-tibet/tibetan-medium-schooling-under-threat>

- 97 20 January 2021, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_10867982, archived at <https://archive.vn/cZ2La>. Also see Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report, 27 January 2021, <https://tchrd.org/chinas-rubber-stamp-parliament-declares-use-of-minority-languages-unconstitutional/>
- 98 12 December 2019, archived at <https://web.archive.org/web/20200901063056/http://bomi.gov.cn/linzhi/xwzx/201912/4433727a90914523b2b7c12335bb0a41.shtml> Also see this report published by the Justice Department of the TAR on 6 July 2018, about a competition for prisoners in studying how to live “a new life” and understanding of the Chinese Constitution: <https://web.archive.org/save/http://mini.eastday.com/a/180706232316632.html?qid=02263&vqid=qid02650>
- 99 A Tibetan arrested after the protests in Kardze in 2008 said that: “Prison regulations allowed for visits from family and friends once a month. But they also stated that visitors and prisoners could only communicate in Chinese. My family was unable to visit me on a few occasions because they were unable to communicate [with prison authorities].” In another case known to Tibet Advocacy Coalition, family members found the monthly prison visits to one Tibetan political prisoner, an intellectual and writer, frustrating because if his mother spoke in Tibetan, she had to ensure that whatever she said had to be translated in Chinese by a family member. This meant she could only speak to her son for less than 15 minutes since the total visit time is usually half an hour.
- 100 New York Times: “Tibetans Fight to Salvage Fading Culture in China”, 29 November 2015: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/asia/china-tibet-language-education.html>
- 101 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report, 11 November 2019, <https://tchrd.org/monk-detained-for-criticising-chinas-policy-on-tibetan-language-at-high-risk-of-torture/>
- 102 Prior to 2008, around 2500-3500 Tibetans escaped into exile. Last year, only 18 were recorded as doing so.
- 103 Lhasa City Justice Bureau Office, web portal in Chinese, 26 September 2015: http://ls.wenming.cn/wmbb/201509/t20150926_2016595.htm
- 104 23 November 2016, Meipan, <https://archive.vn/EB7hj>
- 105 Human Rights Watch report, 14 May 2020, ‘China: Tibet Anti-Crime Campaign Silences Dissent’. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/14/china-tibet-anti-crime-campaign-silences-dissent#:~:text=%E2%80%9CChinese%20authorities%20have%20long%20imprisoned,disloyal%20to%20Communist%20Party%20rule.%E2%80%9D>
- 106 In the “Four Stresses and Four Loves” theme of political education, inmates were cited as saying that “On the basis of pleading guilty and serving the law, they earnestly accept reforms, abide by prison rules and disciplines, actively participate in the education of the rule of law, culture and skills of prison organizations, and establish a correct outlook on life and values. Develop good habits for an early return to society.” Justice Department of the Chinese government website, 1 September 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200901062021/http://sft.xizang.gov.cn/xwzx/ywxx/jygl/201909/t20190923_96044.html
- 107 Nyingtri prefectural government website, 12 December 2019, <http://www.linzhi.gov.cn/linzhi/xwzx/201912/4433727a90914523b2b7c12335bb0a41.shtml>, archived at <https://archive.vn/rd70l>
- 108 The state media first reported the planned new 1,629-km-long railway in 2009 (China Daily, 1 September 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-09/01/content_8642709.htm – report includes map of the route), and the then Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary Chen Quanguo called for acceleration of work on the route in November 2011. (Chen Quanguo, Tibet Autonomous Region Party Secretary, “Firmly and Unswervingly Take the Road of Development With Chinese and Tibetan Characteristics, and Struggle in Unity To Achieve Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Stability and Security”, Tibet Daily, 18 November 2011, reprinted in China Tibet Information Centre, translated in Open Source Centre, 4 December 2011).
- 109 Couples and families were separated while in detention, with some elderly people denied medication. One elderly female relative of a Tibetan in exile who was taken into custody had a heart condition, and fainted in custody while being kept in a separate area to her husband. A Tibetan from Lhasa told the International Campaign for Tibet that the detentions “imposed unbearable psychological and financial pressure on families and communities.”
- 110 China Tibet Net by Wu Jianying (in Chinese), 11 October 2015, <http://www.tibet.cn/news/focus/14471159145.shtml>
- 111 People’s Daily, 24 November 2020, archived at: <https://archive.vn/0BAZn> m at a meeting in Lhasa of the Leading Group of United Front Work Department of Tibet Autonomous Region convened to “thoroughly implement the spirit of Fifth Plenary Session of 19th Regional Party Congress and Seventh Central Tibet Work Forum”. Also see statement from Chamdo reported by Tibet Daily and reproduced online on Chinese social media network QQ on 8 October 2020, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/49sjes8l9SYFLLWW2M_zHw
- 112 This was during a visit to Chamdo (Chinese: Qamdo) in the TAR in October 2020: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/btOyT8DKDNpQEIX5oizx_w, archived at: <https://archive.vn/DV0ln>
- 113 Human Rights Watch, ‘Chinese Authorities Aim to “Liberate” Tibetan Believers: Latest Political Education Drive Targets Religion’, 22 October 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/22/chinese-authorities-aim-liberate-tibetan-believers>. Sophie Richardson of Human Rights Watch said: “This is referred to as “guiding people to take a rational view of religion,” especially the “wastefulness” of offerings and ceremonies, and the reminder that it is the Party and President Xi Jinping whom ordinary Tibetans have to thank for their “happy lives”, not the lamas.”
- 114 The tour was intended to showcase poverty alleviation, and also likely to have been intended to counter and deflect the impact of Adrian Zenz’s findings on “labour transfer” schemes two months earlier.
- 115 Cited by The Times, 22 November 2020, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-aims-to-fix-minds-as-well-as-feed-stomachs-in-battle-to-bring-tibet-into-line-h8cngz878>
- 116 The literal translation of a phrase used by a Chinese work team member in describing the process used by Party cadres when working in rural areas of Tibet to ensure “stability”. Interview carried out by the International Campaign for Tibet, see ‘Storm in the Grasslands: Self immolations in Tibet and Chinese policy’, 2012, p. 48.
- 117 Chinese state media online, ‘Exploring new ways of education and training for Party members in the new era’, 22 January 2019, http://epaper.chinatibetnews.com/xzrb/html/2019-01/22/content_873596.htm International Campaign for Tibet report, <https://savetibet.org/new-training-camp-for-party-cadres-in-tibet-demonstrates-tougher-approach-and-challenges-in-ensuring-loyalty/#1>
- 118 Xinhua, 5 November 2014 http://epaper.chinatibetnews.com/xzrb/html/2014-11/05/content_579554.htm
- 119 ‘The Learning Curve: How Communist Party Officials are Applying Lessons from Prior “Transformation” Campaigns to Repression in Xinjiang’, by Sarah Cook, 1 February 2019, Jamestown Foundation <https://jamestown.org/program/the-learning-curve-how-communist-party-officials-are-applying-lessons-from-prior-transformation-campaigns-to-repression-in-xinjiang/>

- 120 'New Evidence for China's Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang', 15 May 2018, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/>
- 121 As documented in Robert Jay Lifton's classic study, 'Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism'.
- 122 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy report, 28 May 2018, <https://tchrd.org/tibetan-monks-account-reveals-rampant-use-of-torture-and-sexual-abuse-in-chinas-political-re-education-centres/>
- 123 Also see: 'Tibetan Re-Education Camp Journal Tells of China's Tactics Now Used on Uighurs', 25 May 2019, <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/tibetan-re-education-camp-journal-tells-chinas-tactics-now-used-uighurs>. The former detainee says: "Those who the officials didn't like would be captured and tortured with electronic devices. When they become unconscious, [the torturers] would splash water on their faces until their victims regained their consciousness. After doing that for a long time, they would use a black rubber tube as well as electronic baton to torture people. The bruised bodies of the prisoners turned blue and black, and people become half-dead. For some [strange] reason, their bones were not broken."
- 124 This account was given by a Tibetan in exile, referring to the relative of another Tibetan who was one of the nuns abused.
- 125 Both religious encampments (Tibetan: chogar) developed and achieved widespread popularity as non-political hubs dedicated to monastic education, academic learning and Buddhist ethics from the mid-1980s when they were founded. They have now been targeted under three consecutive Chinese Communist Party administrations from Jiang Zemin in 2001 – when hundreds of homes were razed and nuns and monks expelled – to Hu Jintao and now, Xi Jinping, who is presiding over a five-year plan to "Sinicize" Tibetan Buddhism, a hardline policy that seeks to enforce compliance with Party policy, impacting distinctive and authentic expressions of religious practice in Tibet.
- 126 In one account, a Kazakh woman who was held at the Dongmehle Re-education Camp in Ili Kazakh (Yili Hasake) Autonomous Prefecture's Ghulja (Yining) city from July 2017 to October 2018, told RFA in an interview that detainees dealing with the stress of 14-hour days of political study are given a "crying session" every two weeks. Gulzire Awulqanqizi said: "They say, "Now you can cry," but if we cry at other times when we feel the need, they criticize and threaten us, saying they will move us to a different camp," said Awulqanqizi, who now lives in exile in Almaty, in neighboring Kazakhstan. "When we feel sad and cry, they say, "You cannot cry now – you can only cry when it is your allotted crying hour." At the crying hour, they shout at us, "Now you cry!" (Radio Free Asia report, 20 May 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/crying-05202019171525.html>) Another former inmate of the Uyghur prison camps told a journalist: "We couldn't even cry because if you cry, they say you have evil thoughts in your mind." (The Globe and Mail, 31 March 2019, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-i-felt-like-a-slave-inside-chinas-complex-system-of-incarceration/>)
- 127 Radio Free Asia, 1 July 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/re-education-07012019162843.html>
- 128 Human Rights Watch, citing an official announcement in 2012: 29 March 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions>
- 129 RFA, 4 November 2016, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/classes-11042016154905.html>
- 130 Human Rights Watch reported that the song is associated with official Communist Party celebrations and was originally performed in front of Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1959. A banner above the stage reads "Graduation Art Show for the Law and Politics Training Course for Buddhist Monks and Nuns, Kongpo Gyamda County." Kongpo Gyamda county (*Gongbujiangda* in Chinese) is in Nyingtri municipality, and the video is believed to have been filmed there on 10 November 2016. (<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/china-major-tibetan-buddhist-institution-faces-further-demolitions>).
- 131 Gangkye Drubpa Kyab, 36, had been confined in Sichuan's Minyak Rangakha prison for "instigating campaigns for Tibet" before being freed and sent back to his home in Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county on 16 September 2016. After serving four years of a five-and-a-half year prison term, he was taken into custody again after attending a reception in his honour, with Chinese authorities urging him to "change his thoughts." Radio Free Asia, 23 September 2016, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/redetained-09232016132537.html> , and TCHRD, 26 September 2016, <https://tchrd.org/china-detains-recently-released-tibetan-writer-and-his-friend-for-two-week-brainwashing-class/>
- 132 TCHRD, 2 September 2018, <https://tchrd.org/former-tibetan-political-prisoner-released-after-21-years-detained-for-second-time-for-staging-defiant-protest-in-front-of-potala-palace/>
- 133 The press conference heard: "Since the beginning of this year, we have cracked down on illegal organizations 4 times, cracked 14 dangerous security cases, investigated and handled 9 administrative cases, 21 criminal detentions, 15 administrative detentions, and 174 education and training." (http://www.xzxw.com/xw/201905/t20190524_2631496.html)
- 134 Radio Free Asia, 'Tibetan man, aunt, sentenced for Panchen Lama protest in Sichuan', 8 May 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/sentenced-05082019143525.html>
- 135 On 20 January, Shen Chunyao, director of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, found that local legislation requiring ethnic schools to teach in ethnic languages was "unconstitutional", according to the Chinese state media. 20 January 2021, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_10867982, archived at <https://archive.vn/cZ2La> . See Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy report, 27 January 2021, <https://tchrd.org/chinas-rubber-stamp-parliament-declares-use-of-minority-languages-unconstitutional/>

